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I. Introduction 
Until recently when one thought of the great thinkers of phenomenology, 
one thought of Husserl or Heidegger or Merleau-Ponty or some other European 
phenomenologist. Seldom was the name of William James thought of in this 
context. The mention of James conjured up many words such as Pragmatism, 
Radical Empiricism, Pluralism, but the word phenomenology was not associated 
with this great American Philosopher. Today a number of thinkers both in 
America and in Europe are beginning to recognize William James as one of the 
original contributers to the phenomenological movement. Recently, literature 
on James and Phenomenology has grown enormously. The American philosophers 
who are anti-phenomenological but treasure James and the European philosophers 
who are anti-Jamesian but treasur~ phenomenology are finding it more and more 
difficult to avoid the mounting evidence of the connection between William 
James and Phenomenology. There are also those who see the link between James 
and Phenomenology but carefully place him outside the movement as a precursor 
.nlong .side thinkers like Brentano and Stumpf. 
It is our aim in this paper to demonstrate that James deserves the title 
of phenomenologist as much as any successor of Husserl does and perhaps more 
so than some who write.under the flag of phenomenology. He was certainly in-
consistent in his practices of what later cmne to be called phenomenology, but 
he did practice it, and made a number of important phenomenological discover-
! 
ies. In this paper we shall attempt to determine in what sense if any can 
James be classified as a phenomenologist. Our main concern is not to show 
how James influenced Husserl and his successors. Rather our ~oal is to see 
if James' philosophy is phenomenological by con~emporary standards. We in-
tend to explore in detail ~he relationship between James and Phenomenology. 
What is the criteria for being a phenomenolo~ist? The fact is, there 
is no set criteria. There are almost as many phenomenologies as there are 
phenornenologists. Nevertheless there is a connnon core of belief among 
phenomenologists and we shall use the common core to point out the degree 
to which James' thought is phenomenological. 
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In this paper we shall examine James' philosophy in light of the main 
themes of phenomenology and the phenomenological method. Despite the differ-
ences that exist between the various members of the phenomenclc~ic:?l m0\7e-
ment there are common themes explored by nearly all the great phenomenolo-
gists: phenomenological description, the phenomenological reduction, essen-
ces and their essential relationships, intentionality, the life-world, the 
lived-body, and phenomenological constitution. When one thinks of Husserl 
these themes naturally come to mind. It will be the task of this paper to 
show that William James dealt with these same themes and in a manner very 
similar to Husserl and his successors. The degree to which he anticipated 
the insights of phenomenology shall be the central concern of this paper. 
Before we begin our investigation it is important that we point out 
that James was a diverse thinker who because of his continual growth was not 
always consistent nor systematic in his philosophy. A phenomenoloeical 
approach is present in James' thought hut.is must he carefully developed 
3 
because it is intertwined with other aspects of his thought, such as his phy-
siological orientation, his pragmatism, and his radical empiricism. It must 
be admitted that James' concept of psychology as a "natural science" and his 
ascription of thought to its cerebral conditions are unacceptable to contem-
porary phenomenology. Yet Husserl's concept of transcendental subjectivity 
would not be acceptable to James. There are a number of differences between 
Husserl and James and between other phenomenologists and James. Yet there 
are major differences aMong many philosophers identified as belonging to the 
same school. 
The diversity of his thought and this mixing of approaches to the phe-
nomena of conscious life is perhaps one of the major reasons James' contri-
bution to phenomenology was overlooked for such a long time. We don't intend 
to overlook Ja~es' anti-phenomenological tendencies; nevertheless, our main 
concern in this paper shall be to find out where there is a sharing of posi-
tions with James and phenomenology. It is neither our intention to prove that 
James was merely a precursor of phenomenology, nor to deny the originality 
of Husserl's thought. Both men are to be regarded as powerful and original 
thinkers who of ten approach the sam~ topics from different angles while con-
cluctin3 their own independent investigations. It is c>ur principal aim to 
show that despite their differences a number of essential starting points, as 
well as principal views are common to James and Phenomenology. 
Taking the major themes of phenomenology one at a time, we expect to 
show that James did practice phenomenology and does indeed deserve the title 
"phenomenologist" despite the fact he was never consistent nor explicit in 
his practice of it. But the initiators of a movement are always among thP. 
least consistent members of the movement. This is however, no grounds for 
expulsion from the movement. Both James and Husserl were distrustful of 
achieved systems of thought which needed no further revision. Both James 
and Husserl were beginnerR and regarded themselves as such. We shall now 
try to show that phenomenology was common to the thought of both men. 
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I~. Histor1cal Evidence 
The first consideration is the historical data that testifies to the 
link between James and Phenomenology. The information collected by historians 
of philosophy now indicate that James had a profound influence upon the foun-
der of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl. 
Europeans, and especially the Germans, were the first people to take 
noti.ce of the thought of William James. George Santayana in fact once re-
marked "until the return wave of James' reputation reached America from 
Europe, his pupils and friends were hardly aware that he was such a distin-
guished man."l 
The link between James and Phenomenology can be traced back to October 
30, 1882 when William James payed an unexpected visit to Professor Carl 
Stumpf in Prague. Herbert Spiegelberg describes this as "one of the more 
momentous events in the pre-history of phenomenology."i During their three 
day visit 1 James and Stumpf spent over twelve hours in conversation and James 
wrote his wife that he planned to engage Stumpf in a regular correspondence. 
lGeorge Santayana, Character and Opinion in the United States (New 
York, 1921) p. 94. 
2Herbert Spiegelber3, The PhPnomenolo~ical Movement: A Historical In-
troduction (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), Vol. 1., p. 67. 
5 
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According to Ralph Barton Perry, they continued to keep in touch until James' 
h in 1910. 3 deat 
Stumpf was a close friend of Husserl and both were students of Brentano. 
In 1931 Dorion Cairns was told by Husserl that it was Stumpf who had drawn 
his attention to James' Principles of Psycholoey.4 Stumpf, the founder of 
experimental phenomenology said the following about James' Principles of 
Psychology which he referred to as "the best of all psychologies." 
In English speaking countries no thorough investigation of 
psychical life in its peculiar nature even remotely equal in 
penetration and scope has been carried out since Locke. The en-
tire edifice of English Associationistic Psychology, so admir-
able in itself, was thus shaken to its foundation and a correctly 
drawn outline of the psychical life mapped out.5 
Although certain scholars have noticed many parallels between Husserl's 
and James' analysis of the structure of consciousness, 6 Husserl made very few 
specific references to James in his works. But when he did refer to him, he 
was generous in his praise of him. In a footnote in the Logical Investiga-
tions Husserl writes, 
3Ralph Barton Perry, The Thou~ht and Character of William James (Vols. 
1 and 2, Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1935), Vol. 2, Ch. LXII. 
4spiegelberg, Phenor:ienologicnl Movement, Vol. 1, p. 113. 
Stbid., Vol. 1, p. 67. 
6see the works of Alfred Schuetz, Herbert Spiegelberg, Aron Gurwitsch, 
Hans Linschotcn, Bruce Wilshire, James Edie and John Wild that are listed in 
the Bibliography of this -paper. We shall mention the views of these men 
later in this paper. 
It will be apparent from the present work that James' genius-
like observations in the field of descriptive psychology of the cog-
nitive experien~es are far from making psychologisrn inevitable. For 
the help and progress which I owe to this excellent investigation 
in the f iel<l of descriptive analysis hRve only aided my emancipation 
from the psychologistic position.7 
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In another reference to James, Husserl cr~dits him with being the first 
to describe the horizontar structure of experience in his notion of the frin-
ges of consciousness.a 
According to Spiegelberg, Husserl was more generous in acknowledging 
his debt to James in conversation with American visitors during the twenties 
and thirties. To Alfred Schuetz and Dorion Cairns, Husserl made known his 
intention to review James' Principles and to abandon his project for the 
Monatshefte in order to study James more thoroughly.9 Husserl even admitted 
to Ralph Barton Perry that he had abandoned his plan of writing a psychology, 
"feeling that James had said what he wanted to say. 1110 
Besides a few footnotes in his works and certain oral statements, there 
is also Husserl's own diary which testifies to the profound influence James 
had upon him. During his first years as lecturer at the University of Halle, 
Husserl wrote in his diary the following words: 
7Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchnungen (2 Vols., Halle: M. Niemeyer, 
1922), Vol. 2, p. 208. 
·aEdmund Husserl, The Krisis der europaishcen wissenschaften und die 
transzendantale Phanomenolo0 ie (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1954), p. 267. 
9spiegelberg, Phenomenological Movement Vol. I, p. 113. 
lOibid., Vol. I, pp. 113-114. 
Then in 1891-92 came the lecture course on psychology which made 
me look into the literature on descriptive psychology, in fact look 
forward to it with longing. James' Psycholo:-;y, of which I could read 
only some and very little, yielded some flashes. I saw how a daring 
and original man did not let himself be held down by tradition and 
attempted to really put down what he saw and to describe it. Probably 
this influence was not without significance for me, although I could 
read and understand precious few pages. Ind'eed, to describe and to 
bP feithfull this was absolutely indispensable. To be sure, it was 
not until my articl~ of 1894 that I read larger sections and tonk 
excerpts from them.11 
Husserl's article of 1894 is the earliest evidence of Husserl's study 
8 
of James. In it he refers twice to James' chapter on "The Stream of Thought" 
and ~pccifically to his doctrine of "fringes. 1112 
In Husserl's personal library there was found most of the independent 
publications of James. Of these James' Principles of Psycholo3y and an arti-
cle sent by James himself to Husserl, "The Knowing ('If Things Tozether," show 
signs of being studied in detail. Hans Linschoten who had access to Husserl's 
personal copy of James' Principles at Louvain remarks that it contains mar-
ginal notes, key words and tran~lation of terms especially in Part I, ch. 
4-9, 11, 12, 14-16; Part II, ch. 17-22 and 26.13 These sections deal with a 
numhe>r of topics including: habit, streani of thoueht, Pttention, conception, 
time, sensation, reasoninc, the emotions and the wi.11. 
The historical and textual data c]early indicate that James had a clear 
influence on Husserl, but there is ll<"'···cve,.. no evidence that J~mes w;:is infl11-
enced by Husserl. In fact James was not even aware that he had such a pro-
llEdmund Husserl, "Personliche Aufzeichnungen" (published by Biemel), 
Philosophy and Phenomennlndcal Researc:h • Vol. XVI (1955-1956), p. 294. 
12Edmund Husserl, "Psychologischc Studien zur elementaren Lo~ik, 11 
Philos0nhischc Monatshefte, Vol. X.XX (1894), pp. 159-191. 
13Hans Linschoten, On the W:tv T('tward a Phf'nnme.nological Psvcholo~y: 
}hf> P~ycholo:w of lH 11 i<lm James (Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univcrsi ty Press, 1968) 
p. 18, 
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found influence on the German thinker Husserl. Despite his friendship with 
earl Stumpf, James never became interested in Husserl. In fact when asked 
by a publisher whether it be advisable to publish a translation of Husserl's 
Logical Investigations, James replied, "Nobody in America would be interested 
in a new and strange German work on Logic. 1114 
As a result of this there did not appear an English translation of 
Husserl's Logical Investigation!! until 1970.15 Perhaps if James had advised 
differently, knowledge of his relationship to phenomenology might have sur-
faced sooner. 
Fortunately there were students of Husserl's works such as Alfred 
Schuetz and Aron Gurwitsch who saw the link between James and Husserl and 
began research in this area, but this will be discussed below. 
The historical data clearly indicates that James had a strong influ-
. 
ence on Husserl. The historical data itself however, does not point out that 
James clearly anticipated the essential features of Phenomenology. But the 
historical data when taken together with the textual evidence which we are 
about to present in the following chapters, does indicate he anticipated 
many of the essential insights later associated with phenomenology. 
14spiegelberg, Phenorenolo"ical Movement, Vol. I, p. 112. 
l5Edmund Husserl, toz;i.cal Invf'sti~:itions, 2 Vols., Translated by J.N. 
Findlay, (New York: Humanities Press, 1970) .• 
III. Phenomenological Description 
This section will focus upon the main themes of phenomenology and 
their relation to the thought of James. The themes are: phenomenological 
description, the phenomenological reduction, essences and their essential 
relationships, intentionality, the life-world, the lived-body, and phenome-
nological constitution. Herbert Spiegelberg believes these to be the essen-
tial features of_ phenomenology and a good criteria for determining who is 
and who is not a phenom~nol"eist.16 We shall discuss James' relation to each 
of the themes. 
In phenomrnology's methodology, the emphasis is on a description of con-
scious phenomena. Phenomenology is above all a descriptive science. In 
launching his program Husserl gave the order "Back to the things themselves." 
He insisted that we must describe the phenomena as it appears before any 
theoretical explanations of it can be allowed to seep.in. Emancipation from 
preconceptions and the reclamation of the immediate phenomena is one of the 
main principles of phenomenological research. Phenomenological description 
demands a faithfulness to the particular phenomena as it appears and a dis-
trust of any form of reductionism such as employed by traditional empiricists. 
16rhid., Vol. 2, pp. 655-702. 
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The emphasis on description of the phenomena as it appears was a cen-
tral feature not only of the method of Husserl but of James as well. In fact, 
there are indications that James' successful use of this method in his Psy-
£_holosy may have been significant in Husserl's adoption of this method. 
Referring to James' Princinles of Psycholo~y, Husserl wrote in his diary 
that James' faithful description of phenomena as they actually appeared in 
consciousness, probably had a significant influence upon him.17 
"Phenomenological description" was used extensively by James in all 
of his works especially in his Principles of Psychology although this term 
had not yet been invented. His Pscyhology was primarily a descriptive doc-
trine of experience. He was as John Wild points out "a phenomenologically 
oriented thinker with a primary interest in describing empirical structures 
as we live them through."~8 
James like Husserl was against closed systems and favored a descrip-
tive approach to the phenomena of conscious life. In his preface to his 
Psycholo~y James states, "The reader will in vain seek for any closed system 
in the book. It is mainly a mass of descriptive details • 1119 
In describing psychic phenomena faithfully, James like Husserl later 
was Ahle to avoid the mistak<"s of the tri:tditional empiric-1st. James a~cuses 
these em:'irici sts of abandoning the emri dcaJ method, i.e., of describing 
the phenomena as it appears. James states at the beginning of his chapter 
on the stream of thouBht, 
17Hussc>rl, "Personliche Aufzeidmun!7.en," p. 294. 
18John Wild, "Willi~m James nnd the Phennmenolop,y of Belief" in New 
Fssnvs in Phenom~nolor;y, Fd. by James Edie (ChicaEo: (}uadrangJe Books, 1969) 1 
p. 271. 
19william James, The Principles of Psvchnlor,v (Vol. t and H,' New Yot'K: 
Henry Holt and Co., Inc. 1890), Vol. I, p. xiv. 
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' Most books start with sensations, as the simplest mcntnl facts, 
an<l proceed synthetically, constructing ench hiehPr stnge from those 
below it. But this fa abandcning the empirical method of investigation. 
No one ever had a sir.iple sensati.on by itself. Consciousness, from 
our natal day, is of a teeming multiplicity of objects and relations, 
and what we call si!!1ple sensations are results of discriminative atten-
tion, pushed often to a very high degree. It is astonishing what havoc 
is wrought in rsycholo~y by admittinp. at the ou~set ::i.pparently innocent 
suppositions, that nevertheless contain a flaw.-0 -' 
Like Husserl and his followers James demanded that we describe exper-
ience with the minimum of assumptions. "The only thing which psychology 
has a right to postulate at the outset" says James "is the fact of thinking 
itself, and that must first be taken up and analyzed. 11 21 
Not only is faithfulness to the description of concrete phenomena 
apparent in his attack on the elementaristic theory, inaugurated by Locke, 
but this descriptive anti-reductive orientation is evident throughout James' 
Psycho] P.ID: and most of his other works. This phenomenological orientation 
is at work throughout his Varieties of Religious Experience in which he 
continuously faithfully describes religious phenomena without immediately 
passing judgment on its validity. Later on in Essavs in Radical Empiricism 
his descriptive powers in reference to phenomena as they present themselves 
to consciousness is even more obvious. His intention to be faithful in his 
description of the concrete phenomena as it appears is expressed in the fol-
lowin!:; words: "To be radical, ;:in em;-iricisrn must neither admit into its 
constructions any element that is not directly experienced, nor exclude from J 
20Ibid., Vol. I, p. 146. 
21Ibid. 
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them any element that is directly experienced. 11 22 
A return to the things themselves was the watchword not only of Husserl 
but also of William James. By things themselves Husserl meant the phenomena 
as it presents itself before the footlights of consciousness. James put 
similar stress on the intuiting, analyzing and describing of particular 
phenomP.na and their mode of appearance pri.or to any reflection on them. Li.ke 
Husserl ~nd his followers, James reearded all phenomena equally worthy of 
faithful description before making any judgment concerning their status in 
reality. Thus a phenomenological description of religious and psychical 
experience was given by James in his Varieties of Religious Experience and 
his "Final Impressioq~ of a Psychical Researcher." In his essay "On a Certain 
Blindness in Human Beings," James argues strongly against letting our pre-
suppositions enter into our description of experi.ence. This protest against 
this blindness was later taken up by members of the phenomenological movement. 
Herbert Spiegelberg, speaking of "phenomenological descripti.ons" states 
that: 
the common 
fajrer hearing 
thi.s sense the 
William James 
concern is that of giving the phenomena a fuller and 
than traditional empiricist has accorded them. In 
phenomenological goal is closely related to that of 
23 
. . . 
There is no better evidence of what benefits can be reaped from a 
refusal to diminish the phenomena below what is intuitively given then James' 
chapters on stream of thought, the consciousness of self> and the perception 
of time in his Principles of Psycholop;y. Like the successors of Husserl, 
James stood firm against any tendency to simplify or any economy of thought 
22wi lliam James, Ess:'lys in Radknl Empiricfam and a Pluralistic Universe 
(New York: Lon;;mans, Grc£>n and C(I., 1942), p. 25. 
23spiegelberg, _Phenomenological Movement, VoL II, P. 656. ' . 
14 
that would distort the phenomena by stripping it to the bare bones. We must 
describe the whole phenomena just as it appears and neither add explanatory 
concepts and hypotheses nor subtract any part of what is intuitively given 
in the phenomena. 
\ 
James' opposition to simplification and reductionism in the descrip-
tion of phenomena is apparent: "The object of every thought. then is neither 
more nor less than all that the thought thinks exactly as the thought thinks 
it. however complicated the matter, and however symbolic the manner of the 
thinking may be. 11 24 
This loyalty to the phenomena in James' description of its appearance 
reaped James many important and original ideas such as fringes of conscious-
ness and the retentional-protentional structure in our perception of time. J 
A number of these ideas gained through his descriptive approach to psychic 
phenomena had an influence on the phenomenological movement and we shall 
discuss these in detail later in the paper. The important thing to note here 
is that Husserl's treatment of description in the phenomenological methodo-
logy that he advanced had much in common with the thought of William James. 
By continuing this descriptive approach to conscious phenomena the phenomeno-
logical movement gained more insights than even William James dreamed of, but 
there is no doubt that it was James who first showed the great promise that 
the descriptive approach to our conscious life offered. Husserl acknowledges 
this in the following words. "I owe to this excellent investigation in the 
24James, Psychology, Vol. I, p. 276. 
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field of descriptive analysis • • • my emancipation from the psychologistic 
1125 position. 
Although James initially saw psychology as a biological science, he 
came to realize that integral experience is irreducible and that the structure 
of the function of the brain gives us no clue to its make up. James recog-
nized that an investigation of conscious life required an approach somewhat 
independent of the biological approach. Although James held certain physio-
logical presuppositions, he felt that Psychology as an investigation of human 
experience must begin with the description of this experience, and not try 
immediately to explain it away by reducing it to brain processes. According 
to James, the description of the stream of thought is an investigation "from 
within. 1126 
As Hans Linschoten points out, James used both the "way of analysis" 
and the "way of history" and was unable to reconcile these in a satisfactory 
manner.27 The "way of analysis" as practiced by James is the phenomenological 
descriptive investigation of experiential data in their own right. In inves-
tigating the stream of thought the way of analysis according to James is 
concerned with "What does it consist in? What is its inner nature? Of what 
sort of mind-stuff is it composed?"28 As a scientist working within the 
natural attitude, James also practiced the "way of history." Here he was 
concerned with the conditions of production of the stream of thought and its 
connection with other facts, that is with processes and events that are not 
25Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, Vol. II, p. 208. 
26James, Psychology, Vol. I, p. 224. 
27Linschoten, Phenomenological Psychology, pp. 57-58. 
28James, Psychology, Vol. II, p. 283. 
16 
evident from within the stream of experience itself such as brain processes. 
Although James felt as a psychologist he must maintain both approaches, 
it is clear that the descriptive approach of the "way of analysis" proved 
more fruitful for his investigation of the life of consciousness. It is also 
apparent that James was aware that most of his endeavors to reduce experience 
to brain processes were unconvincing.29 
Eventually James came to recognize the impossibility of going to some-
thing more basic than experience. James' failure in his Psychology to dis-
cover sound connections between things experienced and objective processes 
lying outside the realm of direct experience is perhaps the origin of his 
later doctrine of a world of pure experience in Essays in Radical Empiricism. 
Unfortunately in his Psychology, James shifted back and forth from 
emphasis on "way of analysis" to emphasis on "way of history." As Linschoten 
points out the price he paid for this indecision was a lack of unity in the 
early views he expressed.30 There is no doubt however that when he gave 
priority to the way of analysis he was practicing phenomenological descrip-
tion in the best sense of that term, that is, he was giving a descriptive 
account of the stream of experience from within, on its own terms, and with-
out distorting the experiential data through physiological considerations. 
We must conclude that James did practice what later came to be called 
phenomenological description, but at the same time we must acknowledge that 
he practiced this method in a less consistent and systematic way than Husserl 
and most of his followers. But if James seems to be guilty of stepping out-
29Linschoten, Phenomenological Psychology, p. 58. 
30!lli_. 
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side of the descriptive approach from time to time. so also are many of the 
existential phenomenologists who engage in hermeneutics, and perhaps even 
Husserl himself when he ceased bracketing existential claims and posited a 
transcendental ego as the source of all objectivities. 
IV. The Phenomenological Reduction 
One of the main feature> of Husserl's phenomenological method is what 
he called the phenomenological reduction. Similar in some respects to 
Descartes' methodological doubt, the reduction is the act by which the general 
thesis of belief in £actual existence characteristic of the natural attitude 
is inhibited, suspended, bracketed or turned off for the purpose of dis-
covering the acts of transcendental subjectivity which constitutes pure 
phenomena. This reduction which eventually led Husserl to transcendental 
idealism came to be considered by him as the cornerstone of his philosophy. 
One of the main reasons James' contribution to phenomenology is often 
overlooked is the fact that he never explicitly carried out what Husserl 
calls the phenomenological reduction. But overlooking James' contribution 
for this reason is a mistake, because many of the members of the phenomeno-
logical movement, who came after Husserl, rejected his explicit reduction 
and carried on phenomenological analysis without it as Husserl himself did 
in his early work, Logical Investigations. 
As Spiegelberg points out, the notion of the phenomenological reduction 
and its function was never stated by Husserl in an unambiguous and definitive 
fashion, not even in a way that satisfied him personally.31 
3lspiegelberg, Phenomenological Movement, Vol. 2, p. 690. 
18 
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According to Husserl's original notion of the reduction we must suspend 
judgment as to the existence of non-existence of this content of consciousness. 
We do not deny or doubt its existence as in Descartes' procedure, we simply 
bracket this question for the purpose of concentratring exclusively on what 
appears as it appears, i.e. the essential content of the phenomena. This 
-auspension of judgment concerning the existence of transcendent beings 
·eventually was replaced by Husserl's denial of their independent existence 
with the adoption of his transcendental idealism. Very few phenomenologists 
have been willing to follow Husserl on his road to transcendental idealism 
and many regard the performance of an explicit phenomenological reduction 
aa unnecessary and dangerous. 
Although the reduction is a great aid, in that it helps the phenomeno-
logist to treat all data real or unreal on the same level, it is not required 
for an investigator like William James who is careful not to let his existen-
tial bias interfere with his description of phenomena exactly as they are 
given to consciousness. 
Spiegelberg points out that although the phenomenological reduction is 
helpful in describing phenomenaa:id their mode of appearance and the manner 
of their constitution in a way that treats objects both real and unreal on an 
equal footing, it "is still not indispensable for the investigator who is 
already immune to the possible distractions of the existential bias~32 
20 
As a group, the members of the phenomenological movement do treat the 
appearance of phenomena equally regardless of whether they are thought to 
have an existence outside the mind or not. If this be accepted as the 
minimum meaning of a phenomenological reduction which is implicitly accepted 
by most; phenomenologists then I think we have no right to exclude James' 
name from the movement. He was clearly one of the first to treat all appear-
ances on an equal footing. James' notion of sub-universe and his description 
of the role of belief without regard to existential claims indicates clearly 
that he did not let existential bias interfere with his investigation of 
concrete phenomena. James' willingness to suspend traditional beliefs and 
merely describe phenomena as they appear in consciousness is demonstrated 
in practically every single chapter of the Principles of Psvchology as well 
as in: most of his later works. For example, in his chapter on the ''Mind-
Stuff Theory" in his Psychology, James attacks elementaristic theory, in-
augurated by Locke and points out that the explanation implied foisting 
into the mental state under examination knowledge which the psychologist 
has as a psychologist, for example, knowledge about the organic conditions 
of this state and about the consequences of eventual variations of these 
conditions.33 James was determined to describe phenomena as they appear 
without letting scientific theories interfere with a faithful description. 
33James, Psychology, Vol. 1, p. 196. 
21 
Aron Gurwitsch has claimed that James' rejection of the "mind-stuff 
theory" (i.e. the exclusive andisomorphic dependency of "sense data" on 
physical stimuli) should be considered an implicit phenomenological re-
duction. 34 James felt that we must describe the world as it is experienced 
and "lived" prior to reflection on the mental processes themselves. JaJDes 
Edie says: 
This thesis in James comes to an incipient and implicit pheno-
menological reduction and is, no doubt, what he means by the 
idealistic reflections which kept intruding upon him and impeded 
his attempt-to give an explanation of knowledge in terms of 
physiology and science, since physiology and science themselves 
are possible only within the life-world as special and restricted 
aystems of explanation of what is primordially given.35 
The claim that there is an implicit phenomenological reduction in 
James' Psychology does not seem to be supported by James' assertion in his 
preface that "Psychology, the science of finite individual minds, assumes as 
its data (1) thoughts and feelings, and (2) a physical world in time and 
space with which they co-exist and which (3) they know. 1136 It is important 
to note, however, that James does not remain strictly within the realm of 
science as he here depicts it. He states immediately after the above that 
"Of course these data themselves are discussable; but the discussion of 
them (as of other elements) is called metaphysics and falls outside the 
province of this book. 1137 
34Aron Gurwitsch, The Field of Consciousness (Pittsburgh: Duquesne 
University Press, 1964), p. 168. 
35James Edie, "William James and Phenomenology" Review of '-~etaphysici:;, 
Vol. 23 (March, 1970) p. 503. 
36James, Psychology, Vol. 1, p. xiii. 
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He does not, however, stick to this program in his Psychology. Al though 
he began by saying that a properly scientific study of the mind would eschew 
all metaphysics, he was unable to maintain this program even through the 
first chapter of his book; by chapter five he is freely mingling metaphysics 
and science and by chapter six he has become dominantly metaphysical. In 
the last chapter of the Briefer Course, James admits that his "scientific 
psychology" has become one into which "the waters of metaphysical criticism 
leak at every joint. 1138 
James' initial starting point of methodological dualism involved 
assumptions which he could not leave uncriticized and this led to a break-
down in his inital dualism and eventually an acceptance of the "natural 
attitude" which the phenomenological reduction is designed to combat. James 
clearly admits: 
from the common-sence point of view (which is that of all 
the natural sciences) knowledge is an ultimate relation between 
two mutually external entities, the knower and the known. The 
world first exists, and then the states of the mind; and these 
again a cognizance of the world which gets gradually more com-
plete. But it is hard to carry through this simple dualism, 
for idealistic reflections intrude.39 
38william James, Pszchology: Briefer Course, (New York: Henry Holt 
and Co., Inc., 1910), p. 467. (R.B. Perry has stated that James not only 
praised science for its empirical restraint but also provided "wings for 
the flights of speculative metaphysics." I,n the Spirit of Williams James, 
p. 208). 
39tbid., pp. 465-466. 
James' initial plan of methodological dualism does not invalidate 
Gurwitsch's and Edie's claim that there is an implical phenomenological 
reduction in his Psychology because he never remained loyal to this plan. 
James intended to correlate brain states and mental states but he soon 
realized in order to do this, he would have to be able to specify each. 
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It was in the specifying of mental states that the phenomenological orienta-
tion creeped in, for it was impossible to specify what a "mental state" is 
merely on the basis of its being externally and causally conditioned by 
something outside it. 
In the beginning James felt the psychologist must dismiss the philo-
sophical question about knowledge and presuppose two elements, the knowing 
psyche and the known thing, and the one cannot be reduced to the other.40 
In his attempt to specify mental states, James began speaking of objects 
of thought in two senses: in one sense as independently existing thing and 
in another as objects of consciousness. James feels that the psychologist 
must believe that the objects of our consciousness have a twofold existence. 
Yet James wasn't able to avoid a consideration of the presuppositions in-
volved in this dualism. He soon comes to the realization that our faith in 
independently existing things is based on a sense of sameness. 41 This "sense 
of sameness" is the backbone of our consciousness and is the basis of the 
experience of (identical) things.42 James is here not concerned with whether 
40James, Psychology, Vol. 1, P• 218. 
411bid.' Vol. 1, P• 272. 
42Ibid.' Vol. 1, p. 459. 
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there exist any real identity in the things themselves because whether it is 
so or not, we would never notice an identity if we had no sense of sameness. 
James chooses, in the manner of implicit phenomenological reduction, "the 
point of view of the mind's structure alone."43 Although James does not 
suspend or bracket his belief in the factual existence of the objective 
world, he does seem to recognize that the structures of experience are 
logically independent of and "transcendentally" prior to their physio-
logical conditions. In his analyzing of the life of consciousness, James 
was equally concerned, as Husserl was, with its apriori structure and was 
unwilling to let his physiological bias interfere with a faithful description 
of the structure of experience. 
As Merleau-Ponty has pointed out Husserl was constantly re-examining 
the possibility of the reduction. "The most important lesson which the re-
duction teaches us" says Merleau-Ponty "is the impossibility of a complete 
reduction. 1144 The existential interpretation of the reduction put forth by 
Merleau-Ponty which rejects transcendental idealism is one that is quite 
compatible with the thought of William James. There is nothing un-Jamesian 
in the following crucial passage from the Phenomenology of Perception: 
The best formulation of the reduction is probably that given 
by Eugen Fink, Husserl's assistant, when he spoke of 'wonder' in the 
face of the world. Reflection does not withdraw from the world 
towards the unity of consciousness as the world's basis; it steps 
back to watch the forms of transcendence fly up like sparks from 
a fire; it slackens the intentional threads which attach us to the 
world and thus brings them to our notice; it alone is consciousness 45 
of the world because it reveals that world as strange and paradoxical. 
431bid. 
-
4'*Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception, tr. by Colin 
Smith (New York: Humanities Press, 1962), p. xiv. 
451bid., P• xiii. 
Not only is this statement not un-Jamesfan it is actually a restate-
ment of James' primary goal in his chapter on conception. The slackening 
of our intentional threads with the world in order to bring thetn into full 
view is precisely what James does when he presents his version of inten-
tionality under the title, conception. We shall discuss this point in 
greater detail in our chapter on intentionality. For now let me point out 
that Jar.ies anticipates Husserl's and Merleau-Ponty's view that we should 
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examine our involvement in the world by temporarily suspending that involve-
ment in order to determine the relation between our states of consciousness 
and that to which they refer, i.e. our intentional threads which link us 
to the world. The following passage makes clear why Linschoten says con-
ception is James' term for intentionality. James writes: 
The function by which we thus identify a numerically distinct 
and permanent subject cf disclosure is called conception • • • 
The word 'conception' is unambiguous. It properly denotes neither 
the mental state nor what the mental state signifies, but the re-
lation between the two, namely, the function of the mental state 
in signifying just that particular thing.46 
It is evident that what Herleau-Ponty regards as the best formulation 
of the reduction is precisely what James is doing in his chapters on con-
ception and the perception of reality. James steps back from involvement 
in the world in order to discover the intentional structure of consciousness 
which links him to that world; he certainly rejects idealism and stands in 
wonder in the face of the world. 
46James, Psycholo5y, Vol. 1, p. 461. 
That James was willing to treat the data of experience in a manner 
that the reduction was designed to foster is clear in his chapter on the 
perception of reality. Like most of the phenonenologists after Husserl, 
James did not perform an explicit bracketing of the objective world yet he 
did treat all phenomena both real and unreal equally in the description 
of its essential content. This being the main purpose of the reduction in 
the first place, one can say that James like the early Husserl of the 
Lo~ical Investigations and most of his successors made use of an implied 
phenomenological reduction. 
This is evident in James' discussion of the "orders of reality." 
Similar in many respects to Husserl's "regional ontologies," James gives 
a list of the "orders of reality" or the "many worlds" of experience. He 
states that the world of experience consists of perceptual objects, past 
objects, remembered objects, imaginary and unreal objects, hallucintory 
objects, fictional objects, formal or categorical objects, ntll'tber systems, 
scientific lcn~s, theoretical objects, scientific and religious entities, 
"idols of the tribe", particular myths, etc., all of which are given as 
belonging to different but internally coherent systems which constitutes 
the orders of reality.47 
Every object we think of gets at last referred to one world 
or another of this or of some similar list • • • Each world whilst 
it is attended to is real after its own fashion; only the reality 
lapses with the attention.48 
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James points out, in this chapter on the perception of reality, that 
any object of experience which remains uncontradicted is ipso facto believed 
47~., Vol. 2, p. 287. 
48rbid., Vol. 2, p. 293. 
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and posited as absolute reality. He argues that a disbelief in the real 
existence of something occurs only when it is experienced as incompatible 
with something else in our world. Thus our dreams are the whole of reality 
for us while we are dreaming and it is only when awake that we find it nec-
cessary to distinguish the, dream world from the perceptual world. 
When James discusses what he calls "The Many Worlds" he suggests the 
possibility of something closely resembling what was later to be called 
"transcendental phenomenological reduction." Here James points out that in 
the practical attitude of everyday life, dreams, fantasies, illusions and 
the like simply do not count and are dismissed as non-existent. In the 
natural attitude such mental objects "are not even treated as appearances; 
they are treated as if they were mere waste, equivalent to nothing at a11:•49 
James says that "the genuinely philosophic mind" must hold a wider view of 
being than that which guides our practical life. He believes the true 
philosopher should detach himself from the practical attitude in order to 
gain a sound understanding of "the total world which is."50 He recognizes 
that there exist many orders of reality such as fancy, illusion, collective 
belief, abstract reality , ideal relations, etc. Although aware that the 
"natural attitude" plays an important role in one's practical life, he holds 
this attitude in suspense in order to analyze it more carefully. The true 
philosopher must begin by neither asserting nor denying the "natural attitude," 
49rbid., Vol. 2, p. 291. 
sorbid. 
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rather it becomes for him an object of investigation in order that its 
structure may be more clearly grasped in relation to the many other sub-
worlds. 
The complete philosopher is he who seeks not only to assign 
to every given object of his thought its right place in one or 
other of these sub-worlds, but he also seeks to determine the 
relation of each sub-world to the others in the total world which is.51 
In this chapter of his Psychology, James abandons the practical notion 
of existence for one that is much wider and more abstract, and which includes 
not only practical existence, but mathematical, aesthetic, normative, and 
dream existence as well~ 
In the strict and ultimate sense of the word existence, 
everything which can be thought of at all exists as some sort 
of object, whether mythical object, individual thinker's object, 
or object in outer space and for intelligence at large. Errors, 
fictions, tribal beliefs are part of the whole great Universe •• 52 . 
John Wild points out quite accurately that James takes up a detached 
or transcendental position in order to examine all the sub-universes one by 
one with the hope of gaining a final understanding of all of them together, 
and, therefore, of the "total world which is. 11 53 An understan,ling of exper-
ience which is unbiased and impartial requires that James take into account 
all the sub-worlds of experience, and it requires that he assign "every 
given object • • • its right place" and then determine "the relationship 
of each sub-world to the other's in the total world which is."54 
511bid. 
-
521bid., Vol. 2, p. 294. 
53John Wild, The Radical Em~iricism of William James (New York: 
Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1969), p. 146. 
54James, Pszcholo~y, Vol. 2, p. 291. 
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This approach to human experience demanded by James would become in Husserl's 
middle period the main task of phenomenology. The essence of what Husserl 
will later call the phenomenological reduction appears in James' discussion 
of orders of reality certainly not in the full sense that Husserl gave to it, 
but certainly in its essential features. We see here a willingness on James' 
part to bracket the practical mind's narrow conception of existence which 
treats all the sub-universes except one as nothing. The reduction appears 
in this sense in James' writings but it never hardens into an explicit sus-
pension of the questions of existence. 
Like the existential phenomenologist and the later Husserl who spoke 
of the Lebenswelt, James states that all these sub-universes have as their 
ultimate foundation the life world in which alone the ultimate meaning of the 
other sub-worlds is to be found. It .is at this junction that James as well 
as the existential phenomenologist part company with Husserl's transcendental 
reduction and affirm the existence of a life-world that is not constituted 
by transcendental ego but a world that is always already there and one in 
which we always find ourselves. James, like Heidegger and Merleau- Ponty, 
never employed the reduction in the strict and consistent manner that Husserl 
advocated. Like these thinkers,.James was too concerned with revealing the 
life-world and its basic patterns by an existential study. 
Like Merleau-Ponty, James recognized the primacy of the perceptual 
world and with this recognition, one might say, they both stepped outside 
of Husserl's bracket. It should be noted, however, that James accomplished 
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this recognition by first suspending the natural attitude concerning the 
existential claims of the various sub-universes in order to discover their 
relation to each other. 
"Nowhere in the Principles" asserts Wilshire, "is the force of the 
phenomenological strand more evident, and its flowering more nearly complete, 
than in the chapter the Perception of Reality. Here is his version of the 
Lebenswelt. 1155 
We will discuss the Lebenswelt later in this paper. The point I want 
to emphasize here is that James recognized the various orders of reality 
and he also recognized that they should be treated equally by an investigator 
of their essential structure and relationships. This is what Speigelberg 
regards as the minimum meaning of the phenomenological reduction that all 
members of the phenomenological movement are willing to accept. It is this 
sense of the reduction that James (of the Principl~) would be willing to 
accept. The later James who spoke of a world of nure experience came even 
closer to Husserl's notion of the phenomenological reduction. Rut even the 
early James, who was still tied to dualism, refused to let his acceptance 
of the natural attitude interfere with his analysis and description of the 
structures of experience. His denial of consciommess as a substance would 
never have occurred in his Psvchology if he did not refuse to let his 
55Bruce Wilshire, William James and Phenomenology: A Study of "The 
Principles of Psycholo,,GY" (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968), 
p. 171. 
existential bias interfere with his report of what actually appears in the 
stream of thought as it appears. 
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One should not exclude James from a discussion of phenomenology be-
cause of his initial dualism in his Psycholor?!_. One should keep in mind 
that James conducts two levels of investigation in his Psychology. One is 
phenomenological and the other is physiological. Little by little James 
abandons the latter (which he terms his "Physiological preliminaries") and 
begins a phenomenological analysis of the knowing process. He is forced in 
this direction because he soon realizes that in order to correlate brain 
states with mental states (which was his initial goal) he has to specify 
both and this leads him to the discovery that no mental act can be specified 
except through its object. James' analysis of thought's object in his 
chapter on the "Stream of Thought" is thoroughly phenomenological. One 
might say that he begins here to bracket his "physiological preliminaries" 
and introduce an intentional theory of consciousness and a number of other 
phenomenological principles. Unfortunately, James continues to speak two 
very different languages (of the theory of Meaning on the one hand and of 
the causal conditions of thought on the other) haphazardly throughout the 
rest of the text. The physiological level of his investigation keeps 
cropping up here and there and when it does the implied.phenomenological 
reduction which Edie and Gurwitsch claim for James is nowhere evident. But 
when he leaves his physiological preliminaries behind him it is clearly 
evident that James is willing to meet and describe the stream of experience 
on its own terms without an existential bias interfering with his invest!-
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gation. It is here that James' dualism undergoes internal attack from two 
sides: the intrinsic referentialness of thought to world, and the intrinsic 
intendability of the world. And this is what James refers to when he writes, 
" ••• it is hard to carry through this simple dualism, for idealistic 
. 
reflections intrude."56 
The fact that James shifts back and forth between these a~o types of 
investigation is, according to Bruce Wilshire, what makes the book seriously 
"flawed. n57 There is no doubt that this could have been prevented by an 
explicit bracketing of the objective world, that is an explicit phenomeno-
logical reduction. Husserl was able to avoid many of James' problems by 
his explicit suspension of belief in the objective world. But then Husserl 
had the advantage of reading James and not the reverse. 
There is, of course, a danger in Husserl's Phenomenological reduction. 
As Spiegelberg points out, the reduction becomes hazardous and can indeed 
falsify the approach to the phenomena when this temporary suspension of 
belief hardens into a cancellation and unnoticeably leads to the permanent 
neglect of the question of being and existence. This is perhaps the main 
reason the bracket is not found in the works of existential phenomenologists 
like Heidegger and Sartre. 
What is common amongst phenomenologists is not Husserl's bracketing. 
What is common amongst them is a willingness to intuit, analyze and describe 
56James, Psychologr: A Briefe!_ Course, pp. 464-465. 
57wilshire, James and Phenomenology, pp. 16-17. 
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all phenomena just as it appears without first taking into account its claim 
to reality and without distorting the phenomena through an existential bias. 
Spiegelberg calls this an implied phenomenological reduction although it is 
a watered down version of Husserl's notion. But if his notion of the re-
duction is not watered down and its transcendental idealistic tendencies 
removed, and if the explicit bracket is made a requirement for membership 
in the phenomenological movement, Husserl would stand almost alone not only 
without James but without Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Sartre, and many 
others. 
As mentioned before, Husserl was doing phenomenology quite well in 
his Logical Investigations without any explicit bracketing. And it will be 
shown that William James was doing it even before Husserl also without any 
explicit suspension of belief in the objective world. In any case, let it 
suffice for now that James' refusal to bracket is no grounds to exclude him 
from phenomenology. Let it also be noted that James, like the later exis-
tential phenomenologists, did employ what Spiegelbert calls the minimum 
sense of the reduction which is shared by all phenomenologists. 
At this point, I may lose those readers who identify phenomenology 
solely with the thought of Edmund Husserl. Nevertheless, I am unwilling to 
admit that phenomenology has only one voice, that of Husserl, There are 
others -- all of them equally important to the phenomenological movement 
such as Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Scheler and Hartmann among many. 
If one now objects that Husserl is the founder of phenomenology and, there~ 
fore is the sole voice of phenomenology, one might reply in a Jamesian 
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manner that he merely gave a name to some old ways of thinking. I say old 
because James was practicing phenomenology prior to Husserl. I do not mean 
to say that Husserl was not an original thinker. He was, and he did establish 
many phenomenological principles, but he is not ~he sole speaker of pheno-
menology and there are ind~cations that he may not have even been its first 
speaker. About these indications this paper will have more to say. 
Nevertheless, even those who regard Husserl's explicit bracketing as a 
necessary feature of phenomenology must admit that James' chapter on the per-
ception of reality with its discussion of belief and sub-universes certainly 
comes close to Husserl's version of the reduction and is quite compatible 
with the view adopted by later existential phenomenologists such as Merleau-
Ponty who spoke of the primacy of perceptual reality. 
V. Essences' and their Essential Relationships 
The phenomenological reduction is not the only reduction that Husserl 
spoke of. Ile also spoke of an eidetic reduction. Through it we are able to 
describe essences and their essential relationships just as they are given in 
consciousness. We must not analyze James' relation to the phenomenological 
theory of essences and their essential relationships. 
Phenomenology is concerned with investigating general essences, that is, 
it.is an eidetic science. According to Husserl, we do directly experience 
essences and they are irreducible entities like particulars. There is no 
common formula by which all phenomenologists practice the eidetic method. It 
in fact goes under various names in phenomenology such as "experience of 
essences" (Wesenserfahrung), "insight into essences" (Wesenseinsicht), "cog-
nition of essences" (Wesenserkenntnis) and "essential intuiting" (Wesensschau). 
Herbert Spiegelberg points out that "eidetic intuition constitutes a connnon 
element of the phenomenological method as interpreted by the Movement, even 
though it is played down or reinterpreted by the existential phenomenolo-
gis t. "58 The question we have to be concerned with now in our investigation 
of the relationship between James and Phenomenology is: Is James' notion of 
essence so incompatible with Husserl and his followers that it is grounds for 
his exclusion from the phenomenological movement? 
58spiegelberg, Phenomenological Movement, Vol. II, p. 676. 
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I hope to show in this section of my paper that James' notion of 
essence is not totally incompatible with that of Husserl's and it is even 
more compatible with the existential phenomenologist like Heidegger. 
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First, let us state flatly that Husserl never opted for Platonic 
"realism." According to Husserl essences have merely "ideal" being and they 
have in no sense a reality superior or even equal to that of particular 
entities.59 In fact the later Husserl argued that they are constituted by 
transcendental subjectivity. According to Husserl, exemplifying particulars 
are needed in advance for any adequate intuiting of essences. These parti-
culars may come from either perception or imagination, but in any case parti-
culars as examples are necessary in order to apprehend general essences. 
Husserl saw particulars as stepping stones that led to an intuition of essen-
ces. He called this process by which we proceed from the particular to the 
universal "ideation." Through this process, Husserl believed we actually 
come to experience general essences, and it is untrue to say that we exper-
ience only particulars. These general essences are phenomena given in 
experience. Although particulars as examples are required for the experience 
of a general essence, the essence is not the same as the particular. Husserl 
in fact argues that it is impossible to see particulars as particulars without 
seeing also the general essence which they particularize. 
In its study of essences, phenomenology is concerned with revealing 
essential relationships within a single essence and between various essences. 
"Free imaginative variation" is used to determine the internal relations with-
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in one essence. By this method one can determine what are the essential 
components of an essence like triangle. The essential relationships between 
different essences is also revealed through the method of imaginative varia-
tion. Here it is possible to determine the relationship between such essences 
as color and extension, i.~., whether this relationship is essentially neces-
sary or not. We soon discover in the investigation of the relationship of 
various essences that there is a hierarchy of essences and that the relation-
ship between several essences is determined by their joint essences. Thus 
we soon discover that essences belong to the context of other essences and 
this ·context is fixed. While this seems quite Platonic, we must remember 
that for Husserl, unlike Plato, essences are only ideal being and are in fact 
constituted in transcendental subjectivity. 
Perhaps the best way to begin a discussion of the compatibility of 
James and the Phenomenologist's conception of essence is with James' notion 
of conception: 
Each conception thus eternally remains what it is, and never 
can become another. The mind may change its states, and its mean-
ings, at different time; may drop one conception and take up 
another, but the dropped conception can in no intelligible sense 
be said to change into its successor. The paper, a moment ago 
white, I may now see to have scorched black. But mY conception 
'white' does not change into my conception 'black'. On the con-
trary, it stays alongside of the objective blackness as a different 
meaning in my mind, and by so doing lets me judge the blackness 
as the paper's change. Unless it stayed, I should simply say 
'blackness' and know no more. Thus, amid the flux of opinions 
and of physical things, the world of conceptions, or things in-
tended to be thought about, stands stiff and immutable, like 
Plato's Realm of Ideas.60 
60James, Psychology, Vol. I, p. 462. 
The fixed structure of the relationship among essences which Husserl 
argued for is here pointed out by James. The title radical empiricist may 
mislead, but James is a conceptualist, not a nominalist. 
We saw • • • that the image per se, the nucleus, is functionally 
the least important part of the thought. "Our doctrine, therefore, 
of the 'fringe' leads to a perfectly satisfactory decision of the 
nominalistic and conceptualistic controversy, so far as it touch~s 
psychology. We must decide in favor of the conceptualist ••• bl 
The preceeding two statements from James offers support for the view 
of Professor Edie: 
••• James' "nativism" seems to have been an original attempt to 
elucidate the "transcendental" pre-conscious structures of lived 
perception with which phenomenology has made us familiar. It is not 
a question here of "innate" forms or ideas, structures of the perceiv-
ing subject, but rather a question of certain "open" structures which 
arise in experience • • • James resolutely opposed the metaphysics 
of empiricism (Hume) and naturalism (Spencer). While he was also wary 
of "transcendentalism," is is because he knew only Kant and Hegel.62 
This view may come as a shock to those who thought James was only 
interested in doing empirical psychology. The text does reveal however 
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that in his Principles, James, like Husserl, was concerned with fixed mean-
ings and their relationship to each other. 
Those who take a different stand regarding James might regard the follow-
ing statement by him as evidence that he is anti-phenomenological: "A perma-
nently existing idea or Vorstellung which makes its appearance before the 
footlights of consciousness at periodical intervals is as mythological an 
entity as the Jack of Spades."63 Actually however, there is nothing at all 
anti-phenomenological about this statement of James. Husserl says practically 
61Ibid., Vol. I, p. 473. 
62James Edie, in introd. to What is Phenomenology? by Pierre Thevenaz, 
(Chicago: Quadrangle Books, Inc., 1962), p. 35. 
63James, Psychology, Vol. I, p. 236. 
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the same thing in his Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness. James is 
is not advocating nominalism here, and he is not denying that we have fixed 
meanings and are capable of intending the same object over and over again as 
Husserl will later claim. Actually on this point he is in thorough agreement 
with Husserl. What he is attacking here is the psychologist's fallacy of the 
associationism's theory which holds that the thought of the object's (physical 
thing's) recurrent identity is the identity of the recurrent thought. 
Against this, James argues that thought is not a sequence of identical 
mental bits, what is got twice is the same cognized object as being the same, 
not the same thought. 
The psychologist is often misled because, 
••• he ordinarily has no other way of naming (the thought) 
than as the thought, percept, etc., of that object. He himself, 
meanwhile, knowing the self-same object in his way, gets easily 
led to suppose that the thought, which is of it, knows it in the 
same way in which he knows it, although this is of ten far from 
being the case.64 
Any further discussion of this will lead us into a discussion of James' 
version of intentionality which will be taken up later in this paper. The 
only point I emphasized here, is that James' rejection of a permanently 
existing "idea" far from being anti-phenomenological or a rejection of 
essences, clearly anticipates Husserl's notion of intentionality with its 
distinction of noesis and noema. We shall discuss this point more thoroughly 
however in our section on intentionality. 
James dealt with the fundamental connections of essences which he called 
concepts in a manner that also clearly anticipated the work of Husserl. In 
64Ibid., Vol. I, p. 496. 
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the last chapter of the Principles he gives an explicit treatment of necessary 
truths. Here James denies that necessary truths are generalizations from 
experience. These truths cannot be explained by an empirical account of the 
psychological processes of abstracting, generalizing, and habituation. James 
writes, "There are then ideal and inward relations amongst the objects of our 
thought which can in no intelligible sense whatsoever be interpreted as 
reproductions of the order of outer experience. 11 65 
James' position here will become clearer when we turn our discussion 
to his version of intentionality. Let me say now however that the structure 
of necessary truth pertains to the objects of thought. According to James 
when we intend something in the world we intend it in terms of "permanent 
and fixed meanings, ideal objects or conceptions." He states, 
In chapter XII we saw that the mind can at successive moments 
~ the same, and that it gradually comes into possession of a 
stock of permanent and fixed meanings, ideal objects, or concep-
tions, some of which are universal qualities, like the black and 
white of our example, and some, j.ndividual things. We now see 
that not only are the objects permanent mental possessions, but 
the results of their comparison are permanent too. The objects 
and their differences together form an immutable system. The 
same objects, compared in the same way, always give the same 
results; if the result be not the same, then the objects are not 
those originally meant.66 
Surprisingly, we even find James the advocate of indeterminism 
stating that it is not conceivable that a future experience would invalidate 
the necessary truth. "Instead • of correcting the principle of these 
cases, we correct the cases by the principle. 1167 
65Ibid., Vol. II, p. 639. 
66Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 644-645. 
67Ibid., Vol. II, P• 650. 
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The preceeding words certainly put James in the camp of Husserl and 
Phenomenology. For Husserl and his successors there also exist a fixed sys-
tern of essential relationships between essences called necessary truths which 
are not open to revision by future experience. 
The differences.here between James' and Husserl's views must not be 
overlooked. w"nere James is inclined to attribute our acquisition of permanent 
and fixed stock of meanings to the congenital structure of the brain which 
creates an apriori interest structure, Husserl sees it as constituted by 
transcendental subjectivity. Although this is no small difference between 
these two thinkers, it should be pointed out that most phenomenologists 
reject Husserl's transcendental idealism. It should also be noted that James 
eventually acknowledges his inability to trace our mental states back to 
brain structures. It should also be pointed out that despite their differences 
here both James and Husserl reject both Platonic realism and the associa-
tionist theory of abstraction. Above all it should be recognized that both 
James and Husserl believe in the existence of apriori structures in human 
experience even if they differed on the ultimate origin of these structures. 
Concerning the study of essences, I believe William James would not 
hesitate to agree with the view expressed by Merleau-Ponty in the Phenomenology 
of Perception. After pointing out that there has been a general misunder-
standing concerning Husserl's notion of essences, Merleau-Ponty states: 
But it is clear that essence is her~not the end, but a means, 
that our ,effective involvement in the world is precisely what has 
to be understood and made amenable to conceptualization, for it 
is what polarized all our conceptual particularizations. The need 
to proceed by way of essences does not mean that philosophy takes 
them as its object, but, on the contrary, that our existence is too 
tightly held in the world to be able to know itself as such at the 
moment of its involvement, and that it requires the field of ideality 
in order to become acquainted with and to prevail over its facticity • 
The eidetic reduction • • • is the ambition to make reflection emulate 
the unreflective life of consciousness.68 
That a field of ideality is needed to grasp the meaning of innnediate 
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experience was also pointed out by James. In A Pluralistic Universe, James 
remarked: 
An immediate experience, as yet unnamed or classed, is a mere 
that we undergo, a thing that asks, What am I? When we name and 
class it, we say for the first time what it is, and all these 
whats are abstract names or concepts. Each concept means a parti-
cular kind of thing, and as things seem once for all to have been 
created in kinds, a far more efficient handling of a given bit of 
experience begins as soon as we have cl~ssed the various parts of 
it.69 
In his chapter entitled "Necessary Truths and the Effects of Exper-
ience," James attacks the views of John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer who 
had argued that even formal structures of categorical thinking could be re-
duced to psychological processes. James completely rejects their psychologism 
as Husserl did later in his Logical Investigations. Three "Ideal" worlds 
are discussed by James: those of aesthetic, of ethical, and of scientific 
experience. James declares that we experience in all these realms ideal and 
inward relations amongst our objects of thought which can in no intelligible 
sense whatever be interpreted as reproductions of the order of outer exper-
iences.70 
James argues, as Husserl will later, that the laws of thought which 
govern logical necessity can in no sense be reduced to empirical experience 
or associative connections. In response to those who believe the above 
reduction possible, James proposes a mental experiment. It should perhaps 
68Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, pp. xv-xvi. 
69James, Essays, p. 217. 
70James, Psychology, Vol. II, p. 639. 
be called an "eidetic" experiment for it uses what Husserl will later call 
"free imaginary variation." 
Suppose a hundred beings created by God and gifted with the 
faculties of memory and comparison. Suppose that upon each of them 
the same lot of sensations are imprinted, but in different orders. 
Let some of them have no single sensation more than once. Let some 
have this one and others that one repeated. Let every conceivable 
permutation prevail. And then let the magic-lantern show die out, 
and keep the creatures in a void eternity, with naught but their 
memories to muse upon. Inevitably in their long leisure they will 
begin to play with the items of their experience and rearrange them, 
make classificatory series of them, place gray between white and 
black, orange between red and yellow, and trace all other degrees 
of resemblance and differences. And this new construction will be 
absolutely identical in all the hundred creatures, the diversity of 
the sequence of the original experiences having no effect as regards 
this rearrangement. 
• • • Black will differ from white just as much in a world in 
which they always come close together as in one in which they always 
come far apart; just as much in one in which they appear rarely as 
in one in which they appear all the time. 
To learn whether black and white differ I need not consult the 
world of experience at all; the mere ideas suffice. What I mean by 
black differs from what I mean by white, whether such colors exist 
extra mentem meam or not.71 
James holds that judg~ents of categorical thought have an a-temporal 
and a-spatial quality of a very special kind, which we can call "ideal." 
He holds that there exist apriori truths which no mere outgrowth of habit 
and association can account for. For James judgments of comparison belong 
to a realm of experience which is not subject to the conditions of percep-
tion. "Necessary and eternal relations" says James "form a determinate 
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system, independent of the order of frequency in which experience may have 
associated their originals in time and space. 11 72 James like Husserl escapes 
-
71Ibid., pp. 641-644. 
721bid. t p. 661. 
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psychologism in holding that the laws of logic have a mode of reality inde-
pendent of psychological processes. 
James is also in agreement with Husserl in arguing that necessary 
truths are "of perception," i.e., that they are inseparably given together 
with primary, perceptual reality. According to James, we experience "feel-
ings" of and, of if, of but, and of B.Y_, as surely as we do feelings of blue 
and cold. Both Husserl and James agree that although perception and thought 
are distinct they are given in experience as inseparably conjoined, and one 
does not require a superior "intellectual intuition" to grasp necessary 
truths in the manner Descartes suggested. 
One major difference between Husserl and James concerns James' teleo-
logical notion of essence. Their views however are not totally incompatible 
as some interpreters might believe. In any case, James' notion of essence is 
completely compatible with the view of Heidegger and the existential phenome-
nologist, and if they can be classified as phenomenologist with their view of 
essences so can James. 
According· to James, an essence of a thing is its most important charac-
teristic and this cannot be understood in isolation from its relation to 
man's interest, needs, and purposes. In short it is a "teleological instru-
ment." Concerning the essence of a thing, James says "It is a partial aspect 
of a thing which for our purpose we regard as its essential aspect, as the 
representation of the entire thing • • • the essence, the ground of concep-
tion, varies with the end we have in view. 11 73 
73Ibid., pp. 335-336. 
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A phenomenologist like Heidegger would have no trouble accepting this 
notion of essence. Heidegger in fact argues in Being and Time that in order 
to see something as something demands a circumspective concern.74 The essence 
hammerness appears only after we see an object with the intention of pounding 
nails with it. I don't think that Heidegger would hesitate for a moment to 
agree with James' statement that the essence of a thing is that one of its 
properties which is so important for my interest that, in comparison with 
it I may neglect the rest.75 
But would Husserl hesitate to accept James' notion of essence? Perhaps 
but not necessarily. Ideation seems to be more the work of transcendental 
ego in Husserl rather than a personal ego as in James. It should be noted 
however that the essence of a thing for Husserl (like James) is not something 
laid up in heaven, but is merely the thing's essential characteristics. 
Unfortunately, Husserl does not give a thorough explanation of how the essence 
of a thing is constituted and for him the essence is just given to pure data 
intuition. Concerning this Wilshire remarks, "(Husserl) gives us only a 
thin idea of how the essence is constituted, which is rather odd in a philo-
sophy of constitution ••• In this respect I think that James' conception of 
essence is more adequate than is Husserl's. 1176 
74Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, tr. by J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson, 
(New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1962), pp. 182-203. 
75James, Psychology, Vol. II, p. 335. 
76wilshire, James and Phenomenology, p. 201. 
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Although Husserl might balk at the idea of essence viewed as a teleo-
logical weapon, their positions here are not totally incompatible. Husserl 
might be upset by the relativism of James' notion of essence •. We must not 
however overemphasize James' relativism here. As John Wild points out to see 
complete relativism in James' doctrine of essence is a misinterpretation. 
For any given purpose, certain aspects of the thing are really essential and 
others not.77 Wilshire makes the same point when he writes, ''We can say that 
a thing's essence is given in its fringe: What we would perceive under 
standard conditions of observability and manipulation."78 
· If we acknowledge their views on essences are not totally incompatible 
we must also admit they are not identical. Husserl regarded essences as 
part of a fixed structure constituted by transcendental subjectivity, in which 
personal needs or interests play no role. In James, on the other hand, per-
sonal interest is the apriori element in cognition. 
Despite this difference between James and Husserl regarding viewing 
essence as a teleological instrument, there is a number of similarities 
between them regarding other features of essences and the relations between 
essences which we have already pointed out. Taking this into account and the 
fact that existential phenomenologists concur with James' teleological theory 
of essences, I believe James' views regarding essence should in no way delay 
his admittance into the phenomenological movement. His views on essence might 
cause one to think twice before classifying him directly alongside Husserl, 
but it shouldn't delay his being classified as an existential phenomenologist. 
77Wild, The Radical Empiricism of William James, p. 196. 
78wilshire, James and Phenomenology, p. 201. 
VI. Intentionality 
We must now examine James' relation to another essential feature of 
Phenomenology. One of the most important themes of the phenomenological 
movement is the doctrine of intentionality. Intentionality is the property 
of consciousness of being consciousness of, i.e., of referring to something. 
Husserl regarded intentionality as the central insight of his phenomeno-
logical analysis of consciousness. First put forward by Husserl in his 
Logical Investi!ations, his notion of intentionality was actually a trans-
formation of the doctrine held by his teacl'Era"entano who had revised the 
Scholastic notion of it. 
According to Husserl's doctrine of intentionality, our cogitations 
haVP. the basic character of being "consciousness of" something. What appears 
in reflection as phenomenon is the intentional object, which I have a thought 
of, perception of, fear of, etc. Every experience is, thus, not only 
characterized by the fact that it is a consciousness, but is is simultaneously 
determined by the intentiqnal object whereof it is a consciousness.79 
79Edmund Husser 1, _I_d..;..e..c:;;a;.;.s_:_G_.,.:.,en...__e_ra"_l_I:.;.;n:..:;.t_r_o ..... d_u_c_t_i.._o_n_t_o_P_u_r"""e_'P_h_e_n_om_e_n_o_l_o ... ev_, 
tr. by W.R. Boyce-Gibson (New York: The Growell-Colli.er Puhli_sl1ing Co., 
1962) , sec. 36. 
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Herbert Speigelberg was the first to point out in what sense Husserl's 
conception of intentionality differs from Brentano's and how this difference 
80 
can be traced to the thought of William James. Husserl goes beyond 
Brentano's conception of intentionality of mere relatedness to an object in 
two ways by showing (1) that it involves the identification and objectifi-
cation of "objects" which can be identically the same for a multiplicity of 
different acts of consciousness and that (2) it is an active and selective 
achievement of consciousness rather than a merely passive or static directed-
ness to objects already constituted in their specifity independent of the 
actS Which grasp them aS 110bjeCtS •II 
As we noted earlier, Husserl's personal copy of James' Princioles 
contained certain chapters that were filled with marginal notes. One of 
those chapters was chapter twelve on Conception. In his book On The Way 
Toward a Phenomenological Psycholo!}', Hans Linschoten has stated directly 
It II t 81 that conception is James term for intentionality. 
If one looks at James' chapter on conception one isstruck by the 
similarity between James' views and the two ways in which Husserl went 
beyond Brentano's definition of Intentionality. Compare the first way with 
the following from James' chapter on conception. 
The same matters can be thought of in successive portions of 
the mental stream, and some of these portions can know that they 
mean the same tnatters which the other portions meant. One might 
80spiegelberg, Phenomenolo,aical ~ovement, Vol. 1, p. 115. 
81Linschoten, Phenomenological Psycholo&Y,, p. 181. 
put it otherwise by saying that the mind can always intend, and 
know when it intends, to think of the Same. - This sense of same-
ness is the very keel and backbone of our thinking.82 
These words clearly indicate a similarity between James' notion of 
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conception and Husserl's view concerning the identifying function of inten-
tionality. 
It should also be noted that in regard to the second way in which 
Husserl transforms Brentano's conception of intentionality, James' influence 
is also apparent. Husserl's view of intentionality as an active and in fact 
creative achievement, rather than a passive operation has its counterpart in 
James' philosophy. James was also against a copy theory of knowledge and 
spoke of the function of cognition as a selective process, in which the 
mind's purpose is to take cognizance of a reality, intend it, and be about 
it.83 In words that anticipate Husserl, James states " • 
• • even the 'that' 
which we mean to point at may change from_ top to bott<>tn and we be ignorant 
of the fact. But in our meaning itself we are not deceived; our intention 
is to think of the same. n84 "We are masters of our meanings. 1185 
James defines conception as the function by which we identify a numeric-
ally distinct and permanent subject of discourse. Conception applie~ 
strictly speaking to neither the "state of consciousness" nor to what it 
refers, but rather to the relation between the two. Conception is the re-
lation or function of the mental state in signifying that particular thing.86 
82 4 James, Psz.cholo.ID', Vol. 1, p. 59. 
8Jwilliam·James, T~e Meaning of Truth (New York: Longmans, Green and 
Co., 1911), PP• 1-42. 
84James, Psrchology, Vol. 1, p. 460. 
85James, Psychology, Vol. 2, p. 655. 
86Ib.!_d. Vol. 1, ;. -461. 
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., \t ' In short, c~nception is, as Linschoten points out, James term for inten-
tionality. 
In listing the five essential charactemof thought, James makes the 
point that it is the essence of consciousness that it deal with objects 
independent of itself; that is, that it is intentional in the sense of 
always being conscious of something. As we have shown above, James went 
beyond this minimum notion of intentionality which is also found in Brentano 
to point out that it is an active creative process and it is responsible for 
the character in our acts which allows different acts to have identically 
the same object. 
The similarity between James' and Husserl's notion of intentionality 
is in no sense superficial. It is in fact even evident in the details of 
their doctrine of intentionality. Husserl's term "intentional object" is 
clearly anticipated in James' phrase "things intended to be thought about." 
James' distinction of two types of knat~ledge referring to the same object, 
the pre-predicative knowledge by acquaintance with it and the predicative 
knowledge about it also appear in Husserl's doctrine-Of intentionality. 
James' distinction between object and topic of thought coincides substan-
tially with what Husserl maintains between "object which is intended" and 
"object as it is intended. 1187 As far as Husserl's theory of noerna and 
noesis, Alfred Schuetz believes that it "is but the radicalized expression 
87 Marvin Farber, The Foundation of Phenomenology (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1943), p. 349. 
of James' statement that the object of thought is all that the thought 
thinks, exactly as the thought thinks it. 11 88 As for Husserl's theory of 
a noemtaic nucleus or kernel in each intentional object it corresponds to 
James' theory of fringes revolving around a kernel or topic of thought. 
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Prior to Husserl, James distinguished object of thought from topic of 
thought. By object of thought, James means the thought's entire content or 
deliverance, neither more or less. "The object of every thought" says James 
"is neither more nor less than all that the thought thinks, exactly as the 
thought thinks it 1189 The topic of thought is, however, what the . . . 
thought is about, and not what is thought about it. Aron Gurwitsch has 
pointed out that James' distinction between object and topic of thought, when 
interpreted phenomenologically, motivates the attempt to account for the 
identical topic in terms of multiple objects or, coinciding with Husserl's 
terminology, to account for the identical object in terms of multiple noemata.90 
In the example used by James "Columbus discovered America in 1492" the 
topic may be designated Columbus but the object , hat<Tever, is nothing short 
of the entire sentence.91 Husserl says very much the same thing although he 
uses different terms, in the case of the proposition "the knife lies on the 
88Alfred Schuetz, "William James' Concept of the Stream of Thought 
Phenomenologically Interpreted," Ph.!,losophy and Phenomenological Research 
(June, 1941), p. 447. 
89James, Pszchology, Vol. 1, p. 276. 
90Gurwitsch, The Field of Consciousness, p. 188. 
91James, Psychologz_, Vol. 1, p. 275. 
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table." Husserl also argues that the knife is not the "primary" or the 
complete object of the judgment, only that of the judgment's subject.92 
Unfortunately, despite this distinction, Husserl still uses the term object 
to designate the knife rather than the Jamesian ~xpression topic. 
The above, however, points out an essential agreement between James 
and Husserl concerning their detailed analyses of concrete phenomena. This 
agreement and the ones mentioned earlier stem primarily from the fact that 
both philosophers emphasize the intentional structure of consciousness, 
which does not intend things in isolation but in a fringe of relationships 
with other objects, and with the world as the ultimate horizon. 
The textual evidence clearly supports Spiegelberg's claim that James' 
chapter on Conception was an important directive stimulus in the transfor-
mati.on of the Brentano motiff. But whether James had a direct influence on 
Husserl or not is not our primary concern in this paper. Rather we want 
to know whether he anticipated the main themes of phenomenology and whether 
he himself should be considered a phenomenologist. In regard to our goal 
we can say quite justly that with his theory of conception he anticipated one 
of the most important themes of phenomenology, intentionality, and we might 
add he anticipated this theme in a very Husserlian sense. This factor un-
doubtedly lends support to the view that James should be regarded as a 
member of the phenomenological movement~ 
92Farber, ~he Foundation of_Phenomenolo,&Y, p. 349. 
'VII. The Life-World 
According to Husserl, an object is always intended as in a world which 
serves as its horizon. Intentionality is thus closely linked to Husserl's 
doctrine of Lebenswelt. We must now analyze James' relation to the phenome-
nological notion of "Life-World." 
Lebenswelt is a term used increasingly by the later Husserl and heavily 
emphasized by the French Phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty. It can be defined 
as the encompassing world of our immediate experience of which the world 
described by science is only a derivative formulation. 
Husserl's conception of the Lebenswelt was first presented in his Krisis 
der Europaishcen Wissenschaf ten und die transzendentale Phanomenologie which 
was published after his death. During the last decade of his life 1 Husserl 
was deeply interested in the concept of life-world. Most scholars consider 
his concept of life-world the most fertile idea revealed in his unpublished 
works.93 The term life-world made its first appearance in print in an article 
by Landgrebe, a student of Husser1.94 After studying the unpublished writings 
of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty made the concept of life-world the cornerstone of 
his own philosophy. 
93Aron Gurwitsch, "The Last Work of Edmund Husserl," Philosophy and Phe-
nomenological Research, Vol. 16, (1955-1956). 
94tudwig Landgrebe, "World as a Phenomenological Problem," Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 1, (1940) pp. 38-58. 
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The conception of the Lebenswelt did not however originate with Husserl. 
His former student Heidegger had given his account of in-der-Welt-Sein in 
Sein und Zeit prior to Husserl's writings of that section of the Krisis that 
dealt with the Lebenswelt. Without denying that Husserl's conception of 
Lebenswelt is an independent development of his own thought, it is apparent 
that his thought was stimulated by not only his reading of Sein und Zeit, 
but also by William James' the Principles of Psychology. 
Husserl pointed out in his Krisis that even since Galileo the objec-
tive world of sciences has been gradually replacing the world of our common, 
immediate, lived experience (Lebenswelt). He argues that the ultimate expla-
nation of the world of the sciences demands a return to the life-world to the 
world of the immediate evidence of our lived experience. He stresses the 
fact that the life-world appears to us as always present, as pre-given and 
as prior to and independent of any scientific activity. He notes that every 
phenomena that appears points to a context from which it emerged and appears 
within an ali encompassing horizon, which we call the world. There is always 
a subtle consciousness of the world which permeates all one's activities and 
the consciousness of the world as the ultimate horizon becomes the basis on 
which we accomplish our activities. The life-world for Husserl is a common, 
inter-subjective world. It has an historical and social meaning for the life-
world is essentially related to a certain community at a certain moment in 
history in which one's immediate lived experience takes place. Most impor-
tantly, it is in the life-world that science must discover its foundations 
for only here can an account of space, time and the world be given as we 'live' 
them. 
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Husserl not only speaks of the world as a universal horizon, but also 
as a ground; thus anticipating Merleau-Ponty's later detailed analysis of 
thing and world, as figure and ground. Husserl states that this world pre-
scientifically is already spatio-temporal, and this has nothing to do with 
ideal geometrical points nor with pure straight lines and surfaces. He 
argues that the bodies we encounter in the life-world are real bodies but 
not bodies in the sense of physical science. "The structures of the Leben-
swelt have the same names" says Husserl "But they do not bother, so to 
speak, with the theoretical ideals and hypothetical substructures of Geometry 
and Physics. 1195 This statement is in agreement with the work of Heidegger 
and Merleau-Ponty which has shown that the Lebenswelt is characterized by 
certain stable structures, such as being-in-the-world, and oriented space, 
for example, and that these structures are quite distinct from the scientific 
world frame, and physical space. 
In the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty examines in detail 
the structures of the perceptual world, what Husserl calls the Lebenswelt. 
The life-world is described by Merleau-Ponty as the background from which 
all acts stand out, and it is presupposed by these acts. He declares that 
the world is not an object such that I have in my possession, the law of its 
making. According to Merleau-Ponty the world is the natural setting of, and 
field for, all one's thoughts and perceptions. Merleau-Ponty argues that 
there is no inner man, that truth inhabits, rather man is in the world, and 
only in the world does he know himself. "When I return to myself from an 
95Husserl, Krisis, p. 142. 
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excursion into the realm of dogmatic coIIDllon sense or of science," says 
Merleau-Ponty, "I find not a source of intrinsic truth, but a subject destined 
to be in the world."96 
Heidegger had pointed out previously ta the work of Merleau-Ponty 
similar insights concerning the life-world. In Being and Time, he asserted 
that Being-in is the formal existential expression for the Being of Dasein, 
which has Being-in-the-world as its essential state.97 In this work, Heidegger 
goes to great pains to demonstrate how the theoretical constructions of 
the sciences are really derivative and have their ultimate source in the 
lived-world of circumspective concern which has the character of "ready-to-
hand" 'rather than mere "present-at-hand." 
Husserl's conception of Lebenswelt, Heidegger's theory of in-cer-Wclt-
Sein and Merleau-Ponty's notion of the primacy of the perceptual world have 
all contributed to an exploration of the world of itmnediate lived experience. 
Nonetheless, it was William James who first explored the lived-world, the 
world of immediate experience and "practical reality," and it was probably 
his theory of "fringes" which influenced the development of Husserl's concep-
tion of Lebenswelt.98 
Earlier in this paper we touched upon James' notion of "sub-universes" 
and his description of the world of sensations as the "paramount reality" 
upon which the other worlds or "sub-universes" are built. We took up this 
9~erleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. xi. 
97Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 80. 
98John Wild, "Husserl's Life-World and the Lived-Body" in Phenomenology: 
Pure and Applied, ed. by Erwin Straus, (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press), 
p. 10. 
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topic then in connection with Husserl's Phenomenological Reduction, but now 
we must explore James' notion of the world of "practical reality" in more 
detail to see its relation to the phenomenologist's conception of Life-World. 
James' world of sensations is equivalent to Merleau-Ponty's perceptual world 
and Husserl's Lebenswelt. 
According to James we do not escape from the original reality of sen-
sation. 99 He is not here agreeing with Hume, however, for as we noted ear-
lier he rejects the "sensationalistic" doctrine of e~perience. For James, 
sensations are already related to and involved in things. "Sensible objects" 
says James "are thus either our realities or the test of our realities. 11 lOO 
What James is asserting here is the primacy of the "Life-World." Husserl 
also felt that the perceptual world is the foundation for all the other worlds 
and held that the reality of perception characterizes, in the first place, 
the "ur-doxa." 
For James the paramount reality is the "world of sense" that is the 
concretely experienced "life-world." The worlds of imagination, of dreaming, 
of all idealities, of mathematical and logical thought, and of science are 
derived from>fue paramount reality of the "world of sense." The primary 
reality is the perceptual world according not only to James but also to 
Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, and many other .phenomenologists. Merleau-
Ponty will later refer to this thesis as "the prima<?Y of perception." 
99James, Psychology, Vol. 2, p. 299. 
100 Ibid., p. 301. 
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According to James, the life-world is really real but the other realms 
and sub-universes are not nothing. Each of these realms have a being of 
some kind, each in its own way. The various sub-universes need to be studied 
in order to determine their meaning and relationship to the life-world. We 
must keep in mind however that the ultimate meaning of the various sub-univer-
ses, be it the world of mathematics or dreaming, etc., is discoverable in 
the life-world which alone has room for all the sub-universes. 
After mentioning that there are various orders of reality, James says 
there is a fundamental sense of the word "real". Things are believed to be 
real in this sense when they are thought to be in connection with "reality 
par excellence" -- "existence for itself, namely, or extra mentem meam."lOl 
What James means by the latter he makes quite clear. It is that with which 
the person enters into practical relations; it is that which is believed to 
be sensibly at hand and to which the person turns with a will; it is all that, 
too, which is contained in the fringe of such believed things -- all those 
things believed to be related in space and time. 102 
James states flatly that "the fons et origo of all reality • • • is 
thus subjective, is ourselves."l03 James holds that our own reality, that 
sense of our own life which we at every moment possess constitutes the ultimate 
orientation for our doxic confidence. 
The world of living realities as contrasted with unrealities is 
thus anchored in the Ego, considered as an active and emotional term. 
That is the hook from which the rest dangles, the absolute support • • • 
lOltbid., p. 290. 
102rhid., p. 297. 
lOJrhid., pp. 296-297. 
Whatever things have intimate and continuous connection with my life 
are things of whose reality I cannot doubt.104 
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Some phenomenologists such as Aron Gurwitsch believe it is quite possi-
ble that Husserl's notion of "Lebenswelt" may have its historical origins in 
James' doctrine of fringe. The following passage from James' Psychology 
seems to lend support to this claim: 
The primitive impulse is to affirm immediately the reality of all 
that is conceived when we now abstractly admit a thing to be 
'real' (without perhaps going through any definite perception of its 
relations), it is as if we said "it belongs in the same world with 
those other objects." ••• All remote objects in space or time are 
believed in this way. When I believe that some prehistoric savage 
chipped this flint, for example, the reality of the savage and of 
his act makes no direct appeal either to my sensation, emotion or 
volition. What I mean by my belief in it is simply my dim sense 
of a continuity between the long dead savage and his doings and the 
present world of which the flint forms part. It is pre-eminently 
a case for applying our doctrine of the 'fringe'. When I think the 
savage with one fringe of relationship, I believe in him; when I 
think him without that fringe, or with another one (as, e.g., if 
I should class him with 'scientific vagaries' in general), I dis-
believe him. The word 'real' itself is, in short, a fringe.105 
As we noted earlier in this paper, Husserl who is not known for being 
generous in his crediting of other philosophers, was one of the earliest 
to praise James for being the first to discover the doctrine of fringe. 
For James, as for the phenomenologists who came after him, the meaning of 
real is founded in the most encompassing of all fringes, the whole lived-
world. James' savage is thought of as real because he is thought of in the 
fringe of the flint which we can now feel and hold in our hands. As Wilshire 
points out we hold the savage to be real because we think of him as a being 
104rbid., PP· 296-298. 
105rbid., PP· 319-320. 
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who existed in the very same world which "stings" us with interest and affir-
mation now.106 
The "paramount reality" is thus the world within the reach of our senses, 
the world in which we have a practical and emotional involvement, a world 
upon which we can act and be affected by. The "paramount reality" is thus 
the lived-world according to James. 
We may at times be concerned with the other orders of reality but even 
then the fringes of the "world of sense" are always around us. The other 
realms of being are escapable but not the perceptual world, not the life-
world. We may try to lose ourselves in other realms but the sense-world is 
always there waiting for us when we return. The world of lived experience 
is primary and inescapable • 
• • • other thingsj to be sure, may be real for this man or for 
that - .things of science, abstract moral relations, things of the 
Christian theology, or what not. But even for the special man, 
these things are usually real with a less real reality than that 
of the things of sense. They are taken less seriously; and the 
very utmost that can be said for anyone's belief in them is that 
it is as strong as his 'belief in his own senses. 1 107 
Like the phenomenologist that came after him, James describes the lived-
world as the ground of meaning from which all other meanings, are initially 
derived. James regards the lived-world as the ultimate horizon of all our 
acts of perception. For James we never perceive a thing without perceiving 
a world. An object always has its fringes and its ultimate fringe is the 
world. He writes: "The first sensation which an infant gets is for him the 
106wilshire, James and Phenomenology, p. 179. 
107James, Psychology, Vol. 2, p. 294. 
Universe. And the universe which he later comes to know is nothing but an 
amplification of that first simple germ •••• 11 108 
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James clearly anticipated the phenomenological notion that every object 
of thought is always viewed within the context of the whole lived world. 
According to James, all objects thought about must find a place within a 
system or "world" if they are to be thought about in a determinate fashion 
at all. A leprechaun for example finds itself in the world of fantasy, and 
the number two exists in the world of mathematics. Each object comes with 
a system of objects, i.e., an order of reality which will "tolerate its 
presence. 11109 Each of these realms of being in turn derive their ultimate 
meaning from the world of lived experience, what James calls the paramount 
reality. 
James' position regarding the orders of reality and the primacy of the 
world of concrete experience is in agreement with the later doctrine of the 
phenomenologist. James' theory of the primacy of lived reality makes me 
think that he would not hesitate to agree with Heidegger that man is under-
standable only as a being-in-the-world, and the world itself is understand-
able only if initially seen as it is ordinarily lived by a man, the Leben-
swelt. 
James was not only the first one to point out that there are various 
sub-worlds each containing their own type of being but he was also the 
first to point out that each of these realms are aspects and possibilities 
of the world of practical realities that is the lived-world which is the 
108tbid., p. 8. 
109tbid., p. 293. 
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ultimate horizon of all experience. In locating the primary sense of reality 
in perceptual consciousness he anticipates both Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. 
Much more can be said about James' contributions to what later came to be 
called Lebenswelt but this would lead us into a discussion of James' version 
of the lived-body which I shall discuss in the next chapter of this paper. 
In concluding this section of my paper I will simply say that the 
notion of the primacy of the lived-world is present in James' chapter on 
"The Perception of Reality." It was there long before Husserl, Heidegger or 
Merleau-Ponty ever wrote their version of it. And it is still there for any 
careful reader who wants what may be the best English introduction to the 
Phenomenological concept of "Lebenswelt." 
-VIII. The Lived-Body 
In phenomenology today a companion theme of Lebenswelt is the lived-
body. The lived-body is the living h1.Dllan body of our immediate experience. 
Husserl had suggested in his K£.isis that the life-world of the individual 
person is centered in his lived-body. Husserl, hat~ever, never completely 
developed his notion of the embodied self. As John Wild points out, he 
left his pregnant suggestions concerning "embodied I-ness" undeveloped and 
turned rather to his transcendental theories.110 It was Merleau-Ponty who 
fully developed "the phenomenology of the body-subject." The theory of the 
subjectifized body, however, predates both Husserl and Merleau-Ponty and 
can be found in the writings of William Jal'les. 
Husserl pointed out in his Krisis that my body, as I live it, is very 
different from a physical thing and cannot just be regarded objectively. 
By its way of being in the world and its motility, it helps order and con-
stitute the world field in which it exists. 
Merleau-Ponty speaks of the body as the actualization of existence, 
as the condition for objects and as the vehicle of intentionality. Merleau-
llOwild, Husserl's Life-World and the Lived-Body," p. 19. 
63 
64 
ronty subjectivizes the body and speaks of the body image through which one 
11as undivided possession of the parts ~f his body because they mutually imply 
each other through an integration in a single form. He refers to this lived-
body as the phenomenal body or habitual body. According to Merleau-Ponty, 
the phenomenal body has a spatiality of situation and it enters the figure-
background structure as the third term alw~s tacitly understood forming a 
system with the world. Merleau-Ponty says I 
The word 'here' applied to my body does not refer to a 
determinate position in relation to other positions or to 
external co-ordinates, but the laying down of the first co-
ordinate, the anchoring of the active body in an object, the 
situation of the body in the face of its tasks. 1 11 
Merleau-Ponty describes the body as the vehicle of consciousness, its 
deployment in time and space, its presence to a world (incarnation) and 
its stabilization as habit. 
Prior to the writings of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, James had asserted 
that the core of experience is one's body. The following lengthy passage 
demonstrates clearly that James had anticipated the phenomenological doctrine 
of lived-body. 
The world experienced (otherwise called the 'field of conscious-
ness') comes at all times with our body as its centre, centre of 
vision, centre of action, centre of interest. Where the body is 
'here'; when the body acts is 'now'; what the body touches is 'this'; 
all other things are 'there' and 'then' and 'that' • These words 
of emphasized position imply a systematization of things with refer-
ence to a focus of action and interest which lies in the body; 
and the systematization is now so instinctive (was it ever not so?) 
lllMerleau-Ponty, Phenomenologv of Perception, p. 100. 
j 
that no developed or active experience exists for us at all except 
in that ordered form. So far as 'thoughts' and 'feelings' can be 
active, their activity terminates in the activity of the body, and 
only through first arousing its activities can they begin to change 
those of the rest of the world. The body is the stoI'I"\ centre, the 
origin of co-ordinates, the constant place of stress in all that 
experience-train. Everything circles round it, and is felt from 
its point of view. The word 'I' then, is primarily a noun of posi-
tion. Just like 'this' and 'here•.112 
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As Edie points out, James is not here taking a materialistic positionll3 
but rather a view similar to Sartre when he says "Without being a material-
ist, I have never distinguished the soul from the body. 11114 James points 
out that the various "selves" which we experience and which is the ground 
of ou~ self-identity, all carry as a part of their meaning a reference to my 
body. He says, "the body, and central adjustments, which accompany the act 
of thinking, in the head, these are the real nucleus of our personal iden~ 
tity ••• ~15 According to James the feeling of bodily activities is respon-
sible for what has been called our feeling of spiritual activity. 
James is not a materialist in his description of the body for he is 
talking not of a mere mass of matter extended in space but of the habitual 
body that Merleau-Ponty later investigated. Like Merleau-Ponty, James is 
concerned with the moving, living, conscious body which expresses our 
emotions and is the non-objective center of our lived experiences and of our 
world. 
112James, Essaz.s, p. 170. 
ll3Edie, "William James and Phenomenology," P• 514. 
114J.P. Sartre, Les Temps Modernes, Vol. 1 (1945) P• 7. 
115James, Psxchology, Vol. 1, p. 341. 
James like later phenomenologists holds that one'sbody can never be 
perceived as just another object of consciousness. We know it first of 
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all by "direct sensible acquaintance."116 James points out that one's 
lived-body is never felt as an isolated substance. "Never is the body felt 
all alone, but always together with other things. 11117 The lived-body seen 
as the center of consciousness is never experienced apart from the world. 
The lived-body is inseparably linked to the lived-world. In all this James 
is in agreement with the French phenomenologist, Merleau-Ponty. 
For James, a thing is viewed as real when it is known in a fringe of 
relationships, the primary one being a practical relationship to one's 
lived-body. When an object is fringed in this way it is seen as standing 
in the same world inhabited by one's body. For James, belief reveals reality 
by revealing the object as belonging in past, present, or future to the 
same spatial-temporal field as our active bodily life. 
Like Merleau-Ponty, James argues that the body is felt as the vehicle 
of consciousness. He says that acts of thought and feeling are felt as 
bodily acts.118 Like Merleau-Ponty he is not advocating materialism for he 
is not denying thought or emotion but is pointing out simply the fact that 
we are unable to grasp these as purely psychical, as non-bodily. 
A number of phenOMenologists today are crediting James with being the 
first to explore the structures of the lived-body. Wilshire for example has 
116!!?.!.!!,., Vol. 2, p. 299. 
117Ibid. 
118_!.b!,d., p. 301. 
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credited James with initiating "what Merleau-Ponty calls 1 'the phenomeno-
logy of the body-subject' •11 119 Perhaps, one of the main reasons James' 
contribution to this area of phenomenology has been overlooked for so long is 
the ambiguity of James' writings concerning the body. As Linschoten has 
pointed out, he often mixes his phenomenological treatment of the body with 
his physiological considera,tions .120 This mixing of methods, we have already 
noted, is one of the major flaws of James' entire phenomenology. Merleau-
Ponty's phenomenology of the lived-body does not make James' mistake because 
the mechanistic body of the sciences is rejected right from the start. Be-
cause. of this Herleau-Ponty presents a better and more consistent phenomeno-
logy of the body-subject than James. 
Nevertheless, James' contribution to the phenomenology of the lived-
body should not go unnoticed. His treatment of body stands as one more 
indication that James was practicing what later came to be called phenomeno-
logy. Although he was not consistent in his phenomenological approach to the 
body, one cannot deny that James anticipated much of what phenomenologists 
would later say concerning the body. Like the existential phenomenologists, 
Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, James describes the body as being at the core of 
experience and the origin of reality. Prior to these phenomenologists and 
Husserl as well, James had declared the body to be the "fons et origo of 
all reality. 11121 
119wilshire, .:!,ames and Phenomenology, p. 133. 
l20Linschoten, Phenomenological Psychologz, p. 243. 
l21James, PsY!=hologz, Vol. 2, p. 296. 
!X· 'Phenomenoloaical Constitution 
Closely related to all the essential themeR of phenomenology which 
we have discussed in the previous chapters is the doctrine of phenomeno-
logical constitution. We must now analyze the relationRhip between James 
and phenomenology's theory of the constitution of phenomena in conscious-
ness. 
Phenomenological constitution is the act by which an object is built 
up in consciousness. Phenomenological constitution is the main theme of 
genetic phenomenology to which Husserl began to turn in his later works. 
In his transcendental idealism Husserl spoke of the objects of consciousness 
as the "achievements" of the constituting acts of a transcendental ego. 
As Spiegelberg has pointed out, the meaning of the term constitution 
has remained fluid amongst the members of the phenomenological movement.122 
Most phenomenologists have rejected Husserl's theory of transcendental 
idealism and there are indications that even he found it unsatisfactory. 
One indication of this is that in his latest writings he Reemed to stress 
the concept "Lebenswelt" which he did not always describe as the pure 
creation of a transcendental ego. 
122spiegelberg, Phenomenological Movement, Vol. 2, p. 688. 
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As Spiegelberg has pointed out the term constitution can and often 
is interpreted in a less demanding sense than that used by the later Husserl. 
Most phenomenologists favor the reflective use of the verb according to 
which objects "constitute themselves" in our consciousness. In this sense , 
~lil4J exploring the constitution of phenomena in consciousness is practiced by 
all phenomenologists. 
In general, constitutional studies are concerned with determining the 
way in which a phenomena establishes itself and takes shape in our conscious-
ness. Its purpose is to grasp the essential structures of constitution in 
consciousness. It starts with the thesis that affirms that existence of an 
active and selective mind and rejects the copy theory of consciousness. 
Husserl was quite ambiguous in his use of the term "constitution". 
Sometimes he uses it with a reflexive pronoun thus implying that the phenomena 
of consciousness constitute themselves, and at other times he seems to be 
saying intentional consciousness actively "achieves" the constitution. 
Gradually he came to favor the latter, i.e. the active constitution of a 
transcendental ego. 
In his Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, he tried to trace 
the constitution of all objectivities to the phenomena of time-consciousness. 
Here he introduced his retentional-protentional structure of consciousness 
according to which each moment has its horizon of the just past (retention) 
and the about to be (protention). In his .!,deas, Husserl asserted: 
• • • necessarily attached to the now-consciousness is the 
consciousness of the just past, and this consciousness again is 
itself a now ••• every present moment of experience hasti>out 
it a fringe of experiences, which also share the primordial now-
form, and as such constitute the one primordial fringe of the 
pure Ego, its total primordial now-consciousness.123 
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Husserl came to feel that the constitution of the inner consciousness 
of time was ultimately the 'source of the consciousness of all other objectivi-
ties. He argues that the retentional-protentional structures of time-con-
sciousness is responsible for the fact that a temporal object is seen as the 
same object from one instant to the next. In his Cartesian Meditations, 
Husserl states: 
If we consider the fundamental form of synthesis, namely, 
identification, we encounter it first of alias an all-ruling, 
passively flowing synthesis, in the form of the continuous 
consciousness of internal time.124 
In his Phen~enology of Internal Time-Consciousness, Husserl argued 
that all objects are constituted in the stream of immanent time which is 
itself constituted by the absolute flux of consciousness which he identifies 
with absolute subjectivity. He thus traces the constitution of all objectivi-
ties to a transcendental ego •. 
All phenomenologists are concerned with exploring the constitution of 
phenomena in consciousness. Nearly all of them reject however Husserl's 
transcendental idealism and they see man as a being in the world that is not 
of his own making. All existential phenomenologists such as Heidegger take 
123Husserl, Ideas, Sec. 82, p. 219. 
124Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to 
Phenomenology, tr. by D. Cairns, (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1960) p. 41. 
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this stand. These phenomenologists are concerned with how objects constitute 
themselves in our consciousness and they see man as constitutive of all 
meaning. 
Although James never doubted that certain objects that constitute 
themselves in our consciousness do enjoy autonomous existence, he also 
never doubted that the structures of our consciousness contributed to the 
constitution of these phenomena in our consciousness. He recognized, for 
example, that it does not matter if there exists an identical object, if 
there does not also exist a consciousness with the sense of sameness. With-
out the latter, we would never be aware of the existence of identical objects. 
This sense of sameness is the backbone of our consciousness according 
to James.125 We choose "the point of view of the mind's structure alone!'126 
Whether there exists any real identity in the thing$ themselves or not, we 
would never notice an identity if we had no sense of sameness. The sense 
of sameness forms the basis of the experience of (identical) things. The 
notion of something that remains identical amidst the variation of impressions 
and is evidently independent of the impression is accomplished through the 
"sense-of sameness." In the continuous flux of the stream of experience, 
the sense of sameness is responsible for our faith in the independent 
existence of things we perceive. 127 According to James, I am always able, 
125James, Psychology, Vol. 1, p. 459. 
126Ibid. 
-
127~., P• 272. 
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and am always aware of being able, to think about the snmc I thought of 
before since there exists a "principle of constancy in the mind's meanings." 
Although James does not suspend his belief in the existence of physical things, 
he holds that the sense of sameness is constitutive of identical objects in 
consciousness. According to James, we are masters of our meanings and, in 
128 this sense the world will not be completed without us. 
Like Husserl and most phenomenologists, James recognized the importance 
of temporality in the constitution of identical objects in consciousness. 
The sense of sameness would be impossible if our perception of time was 
simply an awareness of a succession of now points. Realizing this, James 
wrote about what he called the "specious present" which is quite similar 
to Husserl's later doctrine of the retentional-protentional structure of 
consciousness. Although James never saw temporality as tb."e main factor in 
the constitution of the intentional object, he was one of the first to 
point out the retentional-protentional structures of time which Husserl later 
used in the development of his theory of transcendental constitution. 
For James like Husserl the present moment is not a point of time; it 
has thickness. James states: 
In short, the practically cognized present is no knife-
edge, but a saddle-back, with a certain breadth of its own 
on which we sit perched, and from which we look in two direc-
tions into time. The unit of composition of our perception 
of time is a duration, with a bow and a stern, as it were a 
rearward and a forward-looking end.129 
128~., Vol. 2, p. 655. 
1Z9Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 609. 
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In the Ideas where Husserl says that every moment has about it a fringe 
of the just past and about to be, 130 he is giving us simply his version of 
James' famous theory of the "specious present." James was one of the first 
to make theoretical room for anticipated time in his notion of the specious 
present. Husserl's view that "retention" and "protention" are the primary 
dimensions of the time-sense is a view shared by James. In his chapter on 
the perception of time which Husserl later studied, James writes, "These 
lingerings of old objects, these incomings of new, are the germs of memory 
and expectation, the retrospective and the prospective sense of time. 11131 
James had pointed out in his chapter on the stream of thought that the 
stream of experience is constantly changing and sensibly continuous. In 
his chapter on time these two characteristics of thought are further explained. 
We have a persisting stream despite the transitions because actual experience 
seizes upon the earlier experience which in a certain sense is thereby pro-
tracted. This continuance, on the other hand, consists in this: that the 
actual experiences seizes upon the next experience, just as was already done 
by the un-actual, past experience. Without this we would be unable to speak 
of a stream of experience. Husserl says very much the same thing in his 
Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness. In fact, a phenomenologist 
unacquainted with James (and there are many) might mistake the following 
words of James for those of Husserl: "The knowledge of some other part of 
130Husserl, Ideas, Sec. 82. 
131 James, Psychology, Vol. 1, p. 606. 
the stream, past or future, near or remote, is always mixed in with Ou% 
knowledge of the present thing. 11132 
A similar version of James' doctrine of the "specious present" can be 
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found not only in the phenomenology of Husserl but also in that of Heidegger 
and Merleau-Ponty and, in fact, the thought of most phenomenologists. They, 
of course, developed their own notion of temporality that went far beyond 
that of James, but the central core of their theories was still the notion of 
the "extended now" which James was one of the first to point out. 
This notion of the "extended now" played a very important role in 
Husserl's thought concerning the constitution of phenomena. James did not 
give temporality the central position in the constitution of phenomena that 
Husserl did. He did not, however, completely avoid this function of tem-
poraHty. t.ike Husserl, James saw that the retrospective and prospective 
structure of time is the foundation of self-consciousness and reflection. 
According to James, actual experience cannot know about itself but only 
previous experience. Self-consciousness is possible only because of retro-
spection or what Husserl calls retention for this is our immediate link with 
the past that allows for the possibility of reflection upon the past stream 
of experience.133 
132Ibid. 
133James, Psychology, Vol. 1, p. 341. (See also Husserl's Ideas, Sec. 77 
and Herleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception, p. 62). 
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If the specious present with its fringe of the just past and the 
about to be is regarded by James as thRt which makes possible reflection 
and self-consciousnessl~4 it must also be regarded as a necessary condition 
for James' "sense of sameness" which makes possible consciousness of objecti-
vities. 
As James accurately points out a succession of experiences is in itself 
not yet an experience of the succession. James recognized that the past, in 
order that it may be experienced as "past," must be experienced together with 
the present and during the present moment. The specious present makes possi-
ble the experience of an enduring identical object in the stream of experience 
by allowing the past to be experience together with the present and in the 
present which is necessary for experiencing duration and thus also for ex-
periencing an object as an enduring object. Thus the sense of sameness which 
requires the experience of duration has the specious present as its foundation. 
James did not make any special effort to link his doctrine of temporality 
with his notion of the sense of sameness. When one does link these two 
theories one comes up with something quite similar to Husserl's view that 
phenomena are constituted through the retentional-protentional structure of 
time-consciousness. James, however, only paved the way for the theory of 
constitution later adopted by Husserl. 
Like Husserl, James sees the constitution of phenomena in consciousness 
as taking p11.lce on the pre-reflective level of the stream of experience. 
134James, Psychology, Vol. 1, p. 401. 
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According to James, primordial identification, fixation and abstraction are 
not rational, reflective activities but are rather activities that occur on 
the pre-reflective unverbalized level of experience. Sense of sameness is 
not yet reflection, and does not yet presuppose reflection. According to 
James the pre-reflective properties of experience are responsible for the 
articulation of the stream of experience. James' position here is in com-
plete agreement with that of Husserl and his successors. 
The following crucial passage from James' A Pluralistic Universe seems 
to anticipate the views of Husserl and other phenomenologists concerning the 
constitution of the stream of experience. James writes; 
Pure experience is the name which I gave to the immediate flux of 
life • • Only new-born babes, or men in semicoma from sleep, 
drugs, illness, or blows may be assumed to have an experience pure 
in the literal sense • • • • Pure experience in this state is but 
another name for feelings or sensations. But the flux of it no 
sooner comes than it tends to fill itself with emphases, and these 
salient parts become indentified and fixed and abstracted; so that 
experience now flows as if shot through with adjectives and nouns 
and prepositions and conjunctions.135 
This seems to support the claim of Linschoten who said, "James adheres 
firmly to the constitution of thing-experiences, or of structure-nuclei, in 
the stream of pure experience. 11136 This is the position not only of James, 
but of Husserl as well. 
Of course Husserl went beyond this position to explain further how this 
articulation of the stream of experience takes place on the pre-reflective 
level. He argued that the protentional-retentional structure of time con-
sciousness was responsible for the sense of sameness and hence the perception 
of all objectivities. James' views point in the direction taken by Husserl. 
135James, Essays, p. 348. 
136Linschoten, J>henomenological Psychology, p. 180. 
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Unfortunately the relation between the sense of sameness and temporality was 
never fully explored by James. Nevertheless his description of both these 
features of consciousness was no small contribution to the theory of pheno-
menological constitution. And if he did not probe as deeply as Husserl did 
in his exploration of constitution of objectivities in consciousness, perhaps 
it is because (1) he did not suspend his belief in the actual existence of 
physical objects or deny their existence as Husserl later did, and (2) he 
felt that we cannot penetrate into what lies behind experience and since what 
we experience always is already objectivities, we can only postulate a form 
of pure experience in which identification and hence objectification is -.I 
achieved .13 7 
Nonetheless the seeds for a theory of phenomenological constitution 
similar to Husserl's were planted with James' doctrines of the sense of 
sameness and specious present. 
Of course Husserl sees constitution of phenomena as ultimately the 
achievement of a transcendental subjectivity which generates time itself. 
This is not James' solution to the problem of constitution but it is also 
not adopted by most existential phenomenologists. In any case as Alfred 
Schuetz has pointed outl38 James refutes the concept of a transcendental 
ego only within the realm of psychology, leaving open the question of its 
possible application to other provinces of speculation.139 
137James, Psychology, Vol. 2, p. 3. 
138schuetz, "William James' Concept of the Stream of Thought Phenomeno-
logically Interpreted," p. 444. 
139James, Psychology, Vol. I, pp. 370-400. 
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If James does not reduce everything to a transcendental ego his descrip-
tion of the stream of consciousness does contain a number of factors later 
employed by Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and other phenomenologists in their consti-
tutional studies. We have already discovered most of these factors in our 
discussion of intentionality, temporality, and sense of sameness. Most of 
these factors are related to James' doctrine of the fringe. 
James was one of the first to make popular the conception of conscious .--, 
life as a flowing stream. This metaphor was used extensively by Husserl and 
his successors. In his chapter on the stream of thought he begins his study 
of the mind from within, and reaches conclusions later accepted by phenomeno-
logy. Here he lists the following five cl!Q~~s of thought: (1) All thoughts 
tend to belong to a personal consciousness, (2) thought is always changing, 
(3) thought is sensibly continuous, (4) it deals with objects independent of 
itself, (5) at all times it is interested in some parts of these objects to 
the exclusion of others, and welcomes or rejects and chooses from among them. _J 
Thus prior to Husserl, James had already pointed out that consciousness 
is essentially cognitive, always selective, and constantly changing yet sen-
sibly continuous. Awareness of these traits of consciousness was of the 
utmost significance in the development .of Husserl's theory of constitution. 
James' theory of fringes was perhaps his most original contribution to 
the theory of phenomenological constitution. James' theory of fringes is 
related to a number of problems including (1) the problem of the unity of 
consciousness and the horizon, (2) the problem of the object and the topic 
of the thought, (3) the problem of so-called articulated syntheses. 
It is not my intention to cover these problems here but rather to point 
out that Husserl's concept of horizon and Merleau-Ponty's notion of figure-
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background structure, which are so significant to their theories of consti-
tution, are not without their antecedents in James' doctrine of the fringe. 
According to James each of our thoughts is surrounded by fringes of 
not explicitly felt relations; it has a "halo" or "horizon" of psychic over-
tones. For James the continuity of the stream of consciousness is possible 
because there exists between the emergent object of consciousness and its 
surrounding objects a necessary relation. An isolated object within our 
stream of thought is regarded by James as a myth. The stream of thought al-
ways contains substantive and transitive parts. "What we hear when thunder 
crashes is not thunder pure," says James, "but thunder-breaking-upon-silence-
and-contrasting-with-it.11140 According to James there exist feelings by 
which the relations between objects are revealed.141 
James made use of the doctrine of fringe in his version of the Leben-
swelt, Intentionality, and temporality. According to James each object is 
always perceived with the world as its horizon or ultimate fringe. Knowledge 
about an object always includes knowledge of the object's relations to the 
rest of the world and the objects in it. 142 
Fringe or horizon was not just a fertile concept in the thought of 
James. Both Husserl and Merleau-Ponty make use of it e){tensively. Husserl 
speaks of a spatial and temporal horizon in a manner similar to James. He 
also speaks of an inner horizon which each experience has which refers to the 
140Ibid., p. 240. 
141Ibid., p. 245. 
142 Ibid., p. 221. 
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"stream of different appearance-aspects" through which a thing is viewed in 
perception. Husserl views these horizons and especially the protentional-
retentional fringe of the "now" as significant for the constitution of pheno-
mena. 
Merleau-Ponty also sees the concept of horizon as significant for the 
constitution of phenomena in consciousness. For him the world is always back-
ground for a thing. This figure-background structure of consciousness accord-
ing to Merleau-Ponty has a power of motivation which solicits a loss of con-
sciousness in the object which makes it possible for there to be an in-itself-
for-us. Merleau-Ponty says in the Phenomenology of Perception; 
The object-horizon structure • • • is no obstacle to me when I 
want to see the object: for just as it is the means whereby objects 
are distinguished from each other, it is also the means whereby they 
are disclosed.143 . 
In the area of phenomenological constitution, James is perhaps even 
closer to Merleau-Ponty and existential phenomenology than he is to Husserl. 
Like existential phenomenologists he does not see the world as the pure crea-
tiun of transcendental subjectivity. Professor Edie in fact says that Merleau-
Ponty's controversial claim that man is the "absolute source" of the world, 
which seems to contradict much of what he says about the world must be inter-
preted in a Jamesian sense.144 Edie argues that Merleau-Ponty's position here 
would be better understood if seen as a restatement of the following words of 
James: 
143Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 68. 
144James Edie, "Notes on the Philosophical Anthropology of William 
James" in An Invitation to Phenomenology, ed. by James Edie, (Chicago: 
Quadrangle Books, 1965), p. 121. 
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Reality, starting from our Ego, thus sheds itself from point to 
point--first, upon all objects which have an immediate sting of 
interest for our Ego in them, and next, upon the objects most con-
tinuously related with these • • • • These are our living realities 
We reach thus the important conclusion that of our own life which we 
at every moment possess, is the ultimate of ultimates for our be-
lief • • • • The world of living realities as contrasted with unrea-
lities is thus anchored in the Ego, considered as an active and 
emotional term.145 
. . . . 
There are a number of similarities in the thought of James and Merleau-
Ponty of which the lived-body concept is perhaps the most famous. As Edie's 
statement suggests, their views regarding the lived-world also contain a 
number of similarities. But this we have already discussed • 
. Like Heidegger, James sees the importance of action in the constitution 
of phenomena in the world. Heidegger's distinntion of the merely present-at-
hand from the ready-to-hand and his claim that the former is derived from 
the latter is similar to a position held by James.146 According to James; 
meaning and essence, as they emerge in thought, are determined by my active 
interest in the objects with which I am dealing. Here James' term 'interest' 
is equivalent to what Heidegger calls circumspective concern. That James 
would agree with Heidegger's formulation that the merely present-at-hand is 
based and derived from what is ready-to-hand is a view supported by a number 
of passages from James' Psychology. The following is one such passage: 
I am always classing it (object of consciousness) under one 
aspect or another, I am always unjust, always partial, always 
exclusive. My excuse is necessity--the necessity which my finite 
145James, Psychology, Vol. 2, p. 297. 
146Heidegger, Being and Time, pp. 188-203. 
and practical nature lays upon me. My thinking is first and last and 
always for the sake of my doing, end I can only do one thing at a 
time.147 
In the field of phenomenological constituti.on, James holds much in 
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common with Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger. Most of these similarities 
are perhaps not a result of a direct influence of James on these phenomeno-
logists. Here we are however not primarily concerned with who influenced 
whom, but rather with the question: Was James practicing what later came to 
be called phenomenology? And in this section of our paper we have been 
specifically concerned with the question: Did James deal with what later was 
called the problem of phenomenological constitution? In other words, did 
James concern himself with how phenomena are constituted in consciousness 
in a manner that anticipated the work of Husserl and his successors? 
The answer to these q11est:i.ons must be affirmative. It is my opinion 
that the textual evidence merits one saying that James made a clear and 
significant contribution in the area of constitution of phenomena in con-
sciousness. That the fundamental realm of meaning in which we live is con-
stituted by the "active syntheses" of prethematic consciousness is a view 
shared by James and Phenomenology. 
X. Conclusion 
We have examined the main themes of phenomenology as they appear in the 
thought of William James. In each section of this paper we have dealt with 
one of these themes and have demonstrated that James had dealt with each 
theme in a manner that was compatible and sometimes identical with the pro-
cedures and findings later adopted by the central figures of phenomenology. 
No section in itself demonstrates that James was a phenomenologist. Taken 
together, they provide an accumulative proof that James was practicing what 
later came to be called phenomenology. James was not a pure phenomenologist, 
but who was except Husserl himself? If the word phenomenology is used to 
embrace the thought not only of Husserl but also of such thinkers as Merleau-
Ponty, Heidegger, Scheler and Sartre, we have no right to exclude the name of 
William James from this list. 
This paper has shown clearly that one can find in the thought of James 
the basic principles of phenomenology. A careful reader familiar with pheno-
menology can easily discover the following essential features of phenomenology 
in the thought of James: phenomenological description, phenomenological 
reduction, a phenomenological treatment of essences and their essential rela-
tionships, the concepts of intentionality, lived-world, lived-body, and pheno-
menological constitution. 
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James' treatment of these themes is often similar to Husserl and where 
he differs from him he does so in a manner usually compatible with the views 
of existential phenomenology. Both Wilshire and Wild are correct in placing 
James closer to "existential" than to "transcendental" phenomenology.148 
James' thought concerning the primacy of perception and the embodiment of 
consciousness does put him perhaps closest to Merleau-Ponty. 
The other times where he differs from Husserl stem from James' physio-
logical and scientific considerations which he never did bracket and which 
resulted in much inconsistency in his thought. Despite the presence of these 
othe~ considerations in his Psychology, a phenomenological approach to con-
sciousness is clearly present in this work of James. It is also evident 
in his later essays where these physiological considerations are abandoned. 
It is certainly true that in his Psychology James could never com-
pletely shake off the attitude of the natural scientist with his interest 
in causal theory. He continually mixed his descriptive psychology with his 
explanatory psychology. His Psychology contains heterogenous viewpoints and 
explanations, i.e., it exhibits a methodological pluralism. This is why 
James could not develop an explicit phenomenology as Husserl later did. 
Despite James' unsystematic approach I agree with Linschoten that "James' 
psychology is phenomenological by intention and in its fundamental thoughts. 11149 
The similarities between James and contemporary European Phenomenology 
are just too striking to be overlooked. They are quite apparent in writers 
like Sartre and Merleau-Ponty and they are also evident to any perceptive 
148wilshire, James and Phenomenology, p. 200; Wild, The Radical Empiri-
cism of William James, pp. 143, 151 1 154. 
149Linschoten, Phenomenological Psychology, p. 307. 
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reader of Husserl and Heidegger. The textual evidence presented in each 
section of this paper taken together along with the historical evidence 
mentioned earlier provides, it would seem, good reasons for considering James 
one of the initial founders of the phenomenological movement. 
But, we have not just been arguing here that James should be given a 
new tag. What we hope for is a new interest and a new approach to James' 
thought. He could hold the key to the further growth of phenomenology in 
this country. Using James as an introduction to the difficult European 
works in phenomenology may create an atmosphere in this country more favor-
able ·to the growth of phenomenology. 
The reader cannot but conclude with Professor Edie's evaluation: 
But, reading James today is a refreshing experience. His philo-
sophy, no less than Husserl's was a return to experience, a turning 
from the abstract and derived categories of scientific constructions 
to the life-world in which they are rooted. Insofar as pra~tism 
as a philosophy of experience (in all its complexity and richness) 
is a living current in American thought, there remains the hope 
that William James, in death as in life, may bridge the impassable 
gulf that separates European from British-American philosophy.150 
150James Edie's introduction to Thevenaz's What is Phenomenology?, 
p. 35. 
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